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INTRODUCTION

William Jackson was convicted of two rapes and spent five years in
the Ohio penitentiary before authorities discovered their error. The true
perpetrator of the crimes was not an amazing look-alike. Although both
Jackson and the actual rapist were bearded blacks with trimmed afros
and similar physiques, a comparison of their facial features suggests only
a rough resemblance. Nevertheless, two white women testified they
were positive Jackson was their assailant. Despite several alibi witnesses,
an all white jury convicted him.I
The personal tragedy of Jackson's unjust incarceration has been
widely publicized, 2 and the Ohio House of Representatives has commenced hearings on legislation that would allow him to seek compensation for his years in prison. 3 That the mistaken identification of Jackson
was neither a unique occurrence nor random misfortune has not received much public attention.4 Legal observers have long recognized
1 Open-and-Shut Case, 60 MINUTES, vol. XV, no. 24, at 1 (broadcast by CBS Television,
Feb. 27, 1983).
2 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1982, at A16, col. 3.
3 Open-and-Shut Case, supra note 1, at 7.
4 See Gillers, I Will Never Forget His Face, N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1984, at A19, col. 1
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that cross-racial identifications by witnesses are disproportionately responsible for wrongful convictions. 5 In the last fifteen years, psychologists have compiled empirical evidence that incontrovertibly
demonstrates a substantially greater rate of error in cross-racial recognition of faces. 6 Yet most judges confronted with these findings have refused to permit defense counsel to alert the jury to the potential for
7
cross-racial identification errors.
Several commentators have noted the cross-racial recognition studies, but always in the context of a general survey of psychological studies
relevant to identification testimony. 8 Some writers have argued that the
proper judicial response to the expanding literature on identification error would be to permit expert testimony by psychologists on all of their
findings;9 others have recommended wholesale incorporation of that
data into cautionary jury instructions.10 Neither of these approaches
has found judicial acceptance. Perhaps this is as it should be, for the
importance and reliability of the supporting studies vary widely.
This article proposes discrete analysis of the problem of unreliable
cross-racial identifications. It is premised on the belief that this narrower inquiry will be more productive than any attempt to find a single
remedy for the disparate sources of identification error. The cross-racial
identification problem is both more compelling and more readily ameliorated than other types of misidentification. Thus, the courts should
address it separately.
There is a second reason to separate the problem of cross-racial
identification from other sources of misidentification. Judge Bazelon
has claimed that the criminal justice system has neglected the rate of
cross-racial misidentification because the phenomenon primarily affects
minorities." He may be partially correct, but certainly there is another
aspect to the explanation: the problem is ignored because it involves
race, and race is always an uncomfortable subject. It is particularly uncomfortable where, as with cross-racial misidentification, we cannot
place the blame on a few racist individuals, but must stare straight at
the ubiquity of persisting racial differences. Furthermore, many judges
may fear that merely to mention race in a criminal case is to stir racial
animosity.
Before we can make any progress toward solving the problem of
(citing another recent example of a wrongful conviction based upon cross-racial identification
testimony).
5 See infla notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 18-37 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 110-33, 141-81 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 139, 227-32 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 139, 182 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 227-32 and accompanying text.
11
Bazelon, Eyewitness News, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Mar. 1980, at 105.
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cross-racial misidentification, we must address the technical questions
surrounding the proper role for the relevant psychological data as well
as the broader concerns of racial divisiveness. This article presumes that
discussion of the problem, however disquieting, is better than silent acceptance of wrongful convictions. Part I of this article summarizes and
discusses the psychological data on cross-racial identification; Part II
considers the adequacy of existing legal protections; and Part III addresses the propriety and effectiveness of two possible ameliorating
measures.
I
THE RELIABILITY OF CROSS-RAcIAL IDENTIFICATION

Patrick Wall's classic study of eyewitness identification 1 2 includes a
dramatic case of cross-racial misidentification. The five victims of a kidnapping, rape, and robbery episode, all of whom spent several hours
with the perpetrator, each identified a man who subsequently was
proved to have been several hundred miles away at the time of the offense. When the true criminal was apprehended, it was apparent that,
other than his black skin, he bore no resemblance to the original suspect.13 Wall commented:
In general, there is much greater possibility of error where the races
are different than where they are the same. Where they are different,
there is more likelihood of error where the subject belongs to a minority group and the witness to a majority group than there is in the
opposite situation. 14
Wall wrote in 1965 when there was no empirical evidence to support his impression. Since then more than a dozen studies have investigated this phenomenon-which psychologists call "the own-race
effect"-in carefully controlled laboratory situations. In addition to
demonstrating the existence of the own-race effect, psychologists have
investigated correlations of this phenomenon in an attempt to explain
and predict its occurrence: they have inquired whether all persons are
equally likely to be better at recognizing members of their own race or
whether only persons with animosity towards, or lack of contact with,
other racial groups display the own-race effect. These findings are relevant to the question of whether the ordinary trial technique of crossexamination is sufficient to detect inadequate cross-racial recognition
ability. Related studies have investigated whether these empirical findings accord with the common-sense perceptions of prospective jurors
P. WALL, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES (1965).
13 Id at 75.
14 Id at 122; see alo E. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932). Borchard documents 65 cases of erroneous convictions, including several examples of cross-racial misidentifications. See id at 74-79, 277-80.
12
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and whether presentation of these findings to mock juries affects their
deliberations.
Lawyers often discount empirical studies, relegating them to a footnote at best. Notwithstanding this impatience, a thorough review of
these findings is necessary to assess contentions that the data are too
inconclusive to justify calling them to the jury's attention.
A.

The "Own-Race" Phenomenon

In the typical laboratory experiment in face recognition, subjects
view photographs of a number of faces that are later randomly mixed
with a new set of faces. Usually the length of observation time is carefully controlled. The subject then is asked to select the "old" faces from
among the "new" faces.' 5 Each subject's performance is measured by
plotting "hits" against "false alarms," and compiling the scores statistically into a single measure of observer sensitivity. 16 In studies investigating the own-race effect, the performance of the subjects is aggregated by
race and then each racial group's accuracy is measured on same-race
and other-race photos. Differences in the aggregated scores are then
tested for statistical significance. 17 In order to gauge the importance of
the psychologists' studies, we must examine both the consistency of results and the external validity of the experiments.
1. Laboratory Findings
Although the studies of white subjects are numerous and generally
consistent, studies of black subjects have produced mixed data. There
has been little research to date on Asian subjects. For these reasons it is
convenient to report the own-race effect findings by racial group.
a. White Subjects. Ten studies document a significant difference in
the ability of white American subjects to recognize white and black
faces. 18 The impairment in ability to recognize black faces is substan15 Ellis, Davies & Shepherd,Experimental Studies of Face Identifcation, 3 NAT'L J. OF GRIM.
DEF. 219, 221 (1977).
16 For a more complete description of the statistical measure used in face recognition
studies, see Buckout, Eyewitness Testimony, Sci. AM., Dec. 1974, at 31.
17 Tests of statistical significance calculate the probability that the data obtained from
an experiment could be the result of a random occurrence. For a discussion of the difference
between statistical and practical significance, see D. BARNES, STATISTICS AS PROOF 143-45
(1983).
18 See Barkowitz & Brigham, Recognition ofFaces: Own Race Bias, Incentive, and Time Delay,
12 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 255, 261 (1982); Brigham & Barkowitz, Do "They all look
alike?" The Effect of Race, Sex, Experience andAttitudes on the Ability to Recognize Faces, 8 J. APPLIED
SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 306, 314 (1978); Chance, Goldstein & McBride, DiferentialExperience and
Recognition Memoiy for Faces, 97 J. SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 243, 249, 250-51 (1975) (reporting on two
experiments); Cross, Cross & Daly, Sex, Race, Age and Beauty As FactorsIn Recognition ofFaces, 10
PERCEPTION & PSYCHOPHYSIcS 393, 394 (1971); Galper, "FunctionalRace Membership" and Recognition ofFaces, 37 PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILLS 455, 458 (1973); Luce, The Role of Experi-

ence in Inter-Racial Recognition, 1 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY BULL. 39, 40 (1974);
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tial. Most of these studies used college students as subjects, 19 but the
largest study sampled children at ages seven, twelve, and seventeen, and
adults with an average age of thirty-six. 20 The college student subjects
included residents of New York City, the Midwest, the South, California, and the Southwest.2 1 An eleventh study that sampled young British
22
soldiers and school girls replicated the own-race effect findings.
Only two studies failed to find the own-race effect, but even these
studies provide indirect support for the phenomenon. The first tested
elderly subjects with a mean age of seventy-two.2 3 Although the white
subjects' mean recognition rate for pictures of white male faces was
twice as great as the mean recognition rate for black faces (male or female), the authors found no own-race effect for white subjects because
the recognition rate for white female photos was one-third of that for the
black photos and one-sixth of that for the white male photos. 2 4 The
authors concluded that this unique pattern resulted from the idiosyncratic characteristics of their white female photos. 25 The second apparclerks at
ently anomalous study involved a field experiment:
convenience food stores were asked to recognize the photos of two customers, one black and one white, who had been in the store earlier that
day.2 6 The initial analysis found no own-race effect, but because the
clerks misidentified one of the white customers almost twice as often as
the other three, 2 7 the researchers repeated the analysis omitting the
atypical customer. The second analysis yielded evidence of a modest
own-race effect: white clerks misidentified blacks 54.8% of the time and
Malpass, Racial Bias in Eyewitness Identifcation, I PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY BULL.
42, 43 (1974); Malpass & Kravitz, Recognitionfor Faces of Own and OtherRace, 13 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 330, 333 (1969); Malpass, Lavigueur & Weldon, Verbal and Visual
Training in Face Recognition, 14 PERCEPTION & PSYCHOPHYsIcs 285, 288 (1973).
19 See Barkowitz & Brigham, supra note 18; Brigham & Barkowitz, supra note 18;
Chance, Goldstein & McBride, supra note 18; Galper, supra note 18; Luce, supra note 18;
Malpass, supra note 18; Malpass & Kravitz, supra note 18; Malpass, Lavigueur & Weldon,
supra note 18.
20 See Cross, Cross & Daly, supra note 18.
21 See supra note 19.
22 Shepherd, Deregowski & Ellis, A Cross-CulturalStudy of Recognition Memoy for Faces, 9
INT'L

J.

PSYCHOLOGY 205, 210 (1974).

23 Brigham & Williamson, Cross-racialRecognition and Age.: When You're Over 60, Do They
Still "All Look Alike?," 5 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY BULL. 218 (1979).
24 Id at 220.
25 Id at 220-21. The white female photos were all selected from early 1970s high school
yearbook pictures. Long straight hair was prevalent among these white females. If hair length
and style is a salient clue, particularly for elderly nearsighted observers, this could explain
why the extremely poor performance on the white female photos overshadowed the own-race
effect.
26 Brigham, Maass, Snyder & Spaulding, Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifations in a Field
Setting, 42 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 673 (1982) (subjects were 64 white clerks
and 9 black clerks).
27 Id at 678.
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whites 34.9% of the time.2 8
Four experiments have examined white subjects' ability to recognize Asian American faces. One study reported that white students who
viewed white faces without any previous practice correctly recognized
76.8% of the white faces they were shown; in contrast, white students
who viewed Asian faces without practice recognized only 52% of the
Asian faces. 29 The other three experiments compared white performance on Asian, black, and white faces.30 One team reported two experiments in which whites displayed the greatest accuracy in identifying
white faces but more accuracy in identifying black faces than Asian
faces. 3 1 Another researcher, however, found only marginal differences
between white recognition of white and Asian faces, but a sharply lower
32
rate of recognition for the black faces.
b. Black Subjects. The data on the own-race phenomenon for black
subjects is less consistent. Five domestic studies report that black subjects are significantly less able to recognize white faces than black
34
faces. 33 Four other studies, however, show no significant differences.
Theorists have not been able to explain these differences by reference to
the populations studied. 35 Two studies examining the ability of black
subjects to recognize Asians found blacks less able to recognize Asian
36
faces than black faces.
c. Asian American Subjects. Only one study of the own-race effect has
28 Id Because of the small sample size, see supra note 26, this difference was of "only
borderline statistical significance." Id
29 Elliott, Will & Goldstein, The Effects of DiscriminationTraining on the Recognition of White
and OrientalFaces, 2 BULL. PSYCHONOMIC Soc'y 71, 73 (1973).
30 Chance, Goldstein & McBride, supra note 18 (reporting on two experiments); Luce,
supra note 18.
31 Chance, Goldstein & McBride, supra note 18, at 249-5 1.
32 Luce, supra note 18, at 40-41.
33 Brigham & Williamson, supra note 23, at 221; Galper, supra note 18, at 458; Luce,
supra note 18, at 40; Malpass, Lavigueur & Weldon, supra note 18, at 288; see also Shepherd,
Deregowski & Ellis, supra note 22, at 209 (African subjects had higher recognition scores for
African faces than for European faces).
34 Barkowitz & Brigham, supra note 18, at 261; Cross, Cross & Daly, supra note 18, at
394; Malpass & Kravitz, supra note 18, at 332-33; see also Chance, Goldstein & McBride,supra
note 18, at 251 (noting possibility that some blacks might be expected to recognize whites and
blacks equally well).
35 Four of the five studies on each side used college students as subjects. The largest
study, surveying 7, 12, and 17 year olds, as well as adults, found no significant differences
between blacks' recognition of black and white faces. Cross, Cross & Daly, supra note 18, at
394. The study testing only senior citizens did find the own-race effect. Brigham & Williamson, supra note 23, at 221.
36 Luce found recognition by blacks of Asian faces equal to recognition by blacks of
white faces; both rates were significantly lower than black recognition of black faces. Luce,
supra note 18, at 40.
Chance, Goldstein and McBride found that blacks performed best when asked to identify black photographs, next best for white photographs, and least well with Japanese faces.
Chance, Goldstein & McBride, supra note 18, at 250.
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included Asian American subjects. 37 That study reported that Japanese
Americans are only marginally better at recognizing Japanese American
faces than Chinese American faces; Chinese American subjects display a
reciprocal and equally insignificant tendency. The same study finds
both Japanese and Chinese Americans significantly better able to recognize Asian faces than black faces, as well as significantly better able to
38
recognize black faces than white faces.
There are no relevant studies including Hispanic or Native American subjects.
2. External Validiy
Given that white subjects consistently display a significantly impaired, other-race recognition ability in the laboratory, and that some
black and Asian samples display this impairment as well, can we infer
that witnesses in criminal trials will make proportionately more errors in
cross-racial identifications than in same-race identifications? We will
answer this question affirmatively if the laboratory experiments have
external validity; that is, if there is nothing peculiar to the laboratory
setting that creates the own-race effect. The single field experiment on
cross-racial identification 39 is flawed and provides only modest support

for the own-race effect. 40 Nevertheless, there are several compelling reasons to believe that the laboratory findings discussed above reflect a phenomenon that occurs outside the laboratory.
One reason to believe that the own-race effect operates in criminal
identifications is that the effect is insensitive to experimental manipulation of the incentive the subject has to make a correct identification. We
might expect the obvious importance of correctly identifying a defendant in a criminal case to compel witnesses to scrutinize perpetrators
more closely than they examine laboratory photos, and that this increased effort could overcome the own-race effect. However, experiments that have attempted to create an incentive to remember otherrace faces by offering a monetary reward for accurate recognition have
failed to affect recognition accuracy. 4 1 These observations suggest that
decreased accuracy in the recognition of other-race faces is not within
the observer's conscious control, and that the seriousness of criminal proceedings would not improve accuracy.
The external validity of the laboratory findings is further supported
37

Luce, supra note 18.

38 Id at 40.
39 Brigham, Maass, Snyder & Spaulding, supra note 26; see supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
40 Brigham, Maass, Snyder & Spaulding, supra note 26, at 678.
41 See Barkowitz & Brigham, supra note 18, at 257-63; see also Brigham & Barkowitz,
supra note 18, at 314 (warning subjects that they will be asked to remember faces does not
decrease other-race recognition impairment).
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by the lack of a correlation between recognition accuracy and confidence. We might hypothesize that laboratory subjects would claim to
recognize an other-race face in spite of any uncertainty whereas a witness in a criminal trial experiencing other-race recognition impairment
would refuse to make an identification, or at least would admit his difficulty upon cross-examination. But this hypothesized difference between
the laboratory and a criminal trial presupposes that the mistaken witnessfeels greater uncertainty, which is unlikely. General research on the
relationship between witness confidence and witness accuracy has found
the connection to be extremely tenuous; 42 only in "optimal" conditions
is there any correlation at all between accuracy and confidence. Generally, the witness's personality traits4 3 and the amount of time he spends
rehearsing his story with the prosecutor 44 are the prime determinants of
his confidence level. The two studies specifically investigating confidence in the recognition of other-race photographs are consistent with
the general research on confidence and accuracy. Luce has reported
that his subjects' expressed post-test confidence in their accuracy bore no
relation to their actual performance; 45 Chance, Goldstein, and McBride
have shown that individual pretest statements of expected other-race
recognition performance bore no relation to actual performance. 46 Because witnesses cannot detect other-race recognition impairment in
themselves, they will not offset the unreliability of a cross-racial identification by acknowledging their disability on cross-examination.
A third reason for believing that laboratory results revealing impaired other-race recognition ability are applicable to nonlaboratory
settings is the frequency of casual field observations of the own-race effect. Wall and other courtroom observers have commented that the rate
of misidentification seems higher in interracial crimes. 4 7 Perhaps more
importantly, the ordinary man's consternation at the difficulty of crossracial recognition is so commonplace as to be the subject of both cliche
and joke: "They all look alike." In short, the presence of the own-race
effect in criminal identifications can confidently be predicted even
though it cannot be directly demonstrated.
Moreover, it is clear that the own-race effect in criminal identifications is of noteworthy dimension. In the laboratory studies, it was common for the own-race/other-race recognition rates to differ by thirty

42 See Wells, Ferguson & Lindsay, The Tractability of Eyewitness Confidence and Its Implicationsfor Triers of Fact, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 688, 688 (1981).
43 See Buckhout, supra note 16, at 31.
44 See Wells, Ferguson & Lindsay, supra note 42, at 690.
45
Luce, The Neglected Dimension in Eyewitness Identifitation, 4 CRIM. DEF. 5, 7-8 (1977).
46
Chance, Goldstein & McBride, supra note 18, at 246-47 n.3.
47
See, e.g., P. WALL, supra note 12, at 76; Bazelon, supra note 11.
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percent, 48 and one study reported that people who tried to identify persons of another race madefour times as many errors as those who attempted to identify members of their own race. 49 Because stress is
known to decrease recognition accuracy, 50 the higher stress conditions of
crime and courtroom are not likely to lead to an increase in other-race
51
recognition rates.
B.

Correlates and Explanations of the Own-Race Effect

The ethnocentric explanation of the own-race effect is biological:
minority group members really do "all look alike." This explanation
ignores evidence of a smaller, although still significant, own-race effect
in minorities. 52 It ignores as well anthropological studies of human faces
showing that the only significant difference in the variability of facial
features between racial groups is that Asian females show more variabil53
ity than any other group.
The second theory of the own-race effect points to prejudicial attitudes as an explanation for differences in recognition rates. A 1940
study provided some support for this explanation; it found whites with
pro-black attitudes better at recognizing black faces than whites with
anti-black attitudes. 54 Two recent studies, however, found no correlation between racial attitudes and the own-race effect; white subjects who
showed no indication of prejudice were just as likely to make errors in
recognizing black faces as were white subjects who displayed animosity
48

Goldstein & Chance, Memoyfor Faces and Schema Theog',

105 J. PSYCHOLOGY 47, 47

(1980).
49 See Rahaim & Brodsky, EmpiricalEvidence Versus Common Sense: JurorandLawyer Knowledge of Eyewitness Accuracy, 7 LAW & PSYCHOLOGY REv. 1, 2 (1982).
50 See Fishman & Loftus, Expert PsychologicalTestimony on Eyewitness Identifisation, 4 LAW &
PSYCHOLOGY REv. 87, 92-93 & nn.19-20 (1978).
51 An interaction between the laboratory setting and the own-race effect is possible, but
there is no reason, either empirical or theoretical, to postulate that such an interaction exists.
Luce, one of the psychologists involved in the own-race effect studies, publicized his findings
in popularized form in Psychology Today. Luce, Black, Whites, and Yellows! Thq All Look Alike to
Me, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Nov. 1974, at 106. Within a few weeks after publication, two
dozen black prison inmates had sent letters to him claiming that they had been wrongfully
identified as perpetrators by white witnesses. As Luce notes in a later article, it would be
naive to assume that all of the two dozen men were innocently imprisoned--but it would be
equally naive to assume that none of them were innocently imprisoned. Luce, supra note 45,
at 8.
52 See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
53 See Goldstein, Race-Related Variation of FacialFeatures: Anthropometric Data , 13 BULL.
PSYCHONOMIC SOC'Y 187, 190 (1979); Goldstein, Facial Feature Variation: Anthropometric Data
I, 13 BULL. PSYCHONOMIC SOC'Y 191, 191 (1979); see also Goldstein & Chance,JudgingFace
Similarity in Own and Other Races, 98 J. PSYCHOLOGY 185 (1978) (finding no difference in perceived similarity of own and other-race faces).
54
Seeleman, The Injtence of Attitude Upon the Remembering of Pictorial Material, 36
ARCHIVES OF PSYCHOLOGY 6 (1940),
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55
toward blacks.
A third explanation for the own-race effect points to lack of contact
with persons from other ethnic groups. This explanation is consistent
with a stronger own-race effect for whites than for blacks or Asians, who
will probably have had substantial contact with the white majority. Furthermore, two studies finding that black and white subjects attend to
different facial cues provide at least tangential support for this explanation.5 6 Direct investigations of this hypothesized correlation, however,
are surprising. One study found that white students from segregated
schools were worse at recognizing black faces than were white students
from integrated schools,5 7 but that both groups displayed a significant
own-race effect.5 8 A second study then reported that white students
from integrated schools were less successful at recognizing black faces
than were white students from segregated schools. 5 9 Two further studies
found self-reported interracial experiences wholly unrelated to cross-racial recognition ability.60 Thus, if there is a correlation between exposure to other racial groups and recognition ability, it is either very
61
tenuous or quite complex.

Perhaps the most interesting and comprehensive explanation of the
own-race effect is the schema igidity model proposed by Goldstein and
Chance.6 2 According to Goldstein and Chance, schemata organize information; a schema produces expectations, determines what aspects of
stimuli will be attended to, and reduces the necessity for conscious, voluntary processing. 63 They hypothesize that an individual's ability to
process faces improves as the number of faces he has processed increases.
This improvement, however, decreases flexibility; as the number of
"normal" faces processed increases, ability to recognize deviant faces declines. 64 In the typical child's socialization, most faces the child encounters will be of his own racial group. These "normal" faces will be
55
See Brigham & Barkowitz, supra note 18, at 309; Lavrakas, Buri & Mayzner, A Perspective on the Recognition of Other-Race Faces, 20 PERCEPTION & PSYCHOPHYsIcs 475, 480 (1976).
56 Ellis, Deregowski & Shepherd, Description of White and Black Faces by White and Black
Subjects, 10 INT'L J. PSYCHOLOGY 119, 120-23 (1975); Shepherd & Deregowski, Races and
Faces-A Comparison of the Responses of Africans and Europeans to Faces of the Same and Diferent
Races, 20 BRIT.J. Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 125, 132 (1981).
57 Cross, Cross & Daly, supra note 18, at 394-95.
58 Id
59 Lavrakas, Buri & Mayzner, supra note 55, at 480.
60 Brigham & Barkowitz, supra note 18; Malpass & Kravitz, supra note 18.
61
Galper, who found the own-race effect present in all subjects except a small sample of
white students in a black studies course, hypothesized that it is "functional race membership"
that explains the phenomenon. Galper, supra note 18, at 459. "[Tihe concept of 'functional
race membership' might be applied to perceivers who describe themselves as 'white,' but respond to the present stimuli, in the present context, in a manner indistinguishable from that
of black perceivers, and significantly different from that of 'typical' white perceivers." Id
62 See Goldstein & Chance, supra note 48.
63
Goldstein & Chance, supra note 48, at 48.
64

Id
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overlearned; recognition memory for own-race faces will improve with
age but recognition memory for other-race faces will be increasingly impaired. 6 5 Later experiences with other racial groups will not mitigate
other-race impairment once the face schema has developed. Thus, according to this model, the presence and strength of the own-race effect in
any individual will depend upon the number and kind of his early childhood experiences with other races.
Goldstein and Chance have reported several experiments designed
to test this model. A developmental study of white subjects revealed
that from the ages of six through twelve, recognition rates for Japanese
and white faces are almost identical, and both rates improve steadily
with age. In contrast, white adults had much more difficulty recognizing Japanese faces than white faces; in fact, the adults' recognition rates
for Japanese faces were roughly equal to the face recognition rates of
66
second and third grade children.
In a second set of experiments, Goldstein and Chance hypothesized
that white subjects who had the highest recognition rates for white faces
would be those who had best "overlearned" the schema and who therefore would show a more pronounced own-race effect than poor
recognizers of white faces. This hypothesis proved correct: when Japanese photographs were substituted, the good recognizers lost seventeen
percent of their white face performance levels whereas poor recognizers
lost only six percent of their white face performance levels. 67 Furthermore, Goldstein and Chance predicted that if recognizing own-race
faces involved using the developed schema but recognizing other-race
faces did not, performance on other-race faces should be uncorrelated
with performance on own-race faces whereas test-retest performance
with own-race faces should be correlated. Again, their hypothesis was
confirmed; white subjects who were good at recognizing white faces
were as likely to be bad at recognizing Japanese faces as white subjects
68
who were bad at recognizing white faces.
Although Goldstein and Chance acknowlege that limited sample
size renders the results of their last experiment tentative, they assert that
"[t]aken together, the results of the several studies offer consistent support for a schema interpretation" of the own-race effect. 69 In addition,
the Goldstein-Chance hypothesis is consistent with the data gathered by
others. It explains why experimenters consistently observe the own-race
phenomenon in white subjects, but not in minority group members:
some black and Asian subjects may have learned white faces as well as
65

Id at 49.

66

Id

67

Id at 53.
Id at 52.
Id at 58.

68
69

at 49-50.
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they learned own-race faces because of the number or importance of
white figures in their early lives. It also explains why visual training on
other-race faces improves other-race recognition for a short time, 70 after
which the training effects quickly dissipate: 7' the schema "takes over"
again.
Finally, the schema rigidity theory can incorporate two pieces of
empirical data on the process of own-race and other-race recognition.
First, Ellis, Deregowski, and Shepherd have reported that white and
black subjects attend to different facial features. 72 Second, Chance and
Goldstein have discovered that white subjects respond to own-race photographs more "deeply"; the subjects were more willing to draw inferences about subjective attributes when the persons pictured were whites
than when the photographs were of different races. 73 It may be that
children learn only those features that are most useful in distinguishing
own-race faces and simultaneously learn to associate these features with
various personalities, moods, and attitudes. Such associations then function to help them remember the faces. The important distinguishing
features of other-race faces are not learned, and are therefore less likely
to be noticed. When these features are noticed, they are less likely to be
remembered.
C.

Laymen's Beliefs About Cross-Racial Identification

Jurors tend to believe eyewitness accounts even in extremely doubtful circumstances. 74 Moreover, at least one study found jurors generally
unable to differentiate between accurate and inaccurate eyewitness testimony, even after cross-examination. 75 This inability is partially attributable to the commonly held assumption that a witness's confidence is an
76
important indicator of the accuracy of his testimony.
Three studies have investigated laymen's and lawyers' beliefs about
70 See Elliott, Wills & Goldstein, supra note 29, at 72-73; Lavrakas, Buri & Mayzner,
supra note 55, at 480; Malpass, Lavigueur & Weldon, supra note 18.
71 See Lavrakas, Buri & Mayzner, supra note 55, at 480. The other two studies cited
supra note 70 did not investigate whether the improvement in other-race recognition disappeared after the passage of time.
72
See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
73 Chance & Goldstein, Depth of Processingin Response to Own- and Other-RaceFaces, 7 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY BULL. 475 (1981).
74 See, e.g., Loftus, The Incredible Eyewitness. Reconstructing Memoq, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY,

Dec. 1974, at 117. In this study subjects read summaries of a criminal trial. One-third read
only circumstantial evidence; one-third read additional incriminating evidence from an eyewitness; and one-third also read information revealing that the eyewitness was legally blind.
Only 18% of the jurors who read only circumstantial evidence returned guilty verdicts, but
72% of the jurors who read the eyewitness testimony voted guilty. The knowledge that the
eyewitness was legally blind only reduced the guilty verdicts to 68%. Id at 117-18.
75 See Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological Testimony on the Unreliabilityof
Eyewitnesses Identifration, 29 STAN. L. REV. 969, 994-95 (1979).
76 Rahaim & Brodsky, supra note 49, at 11; Note, supra note 75, at 994-95.
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cross-racial identifications. 77 Loftus, in a study conducted during 1977
and 1978, surveyed 500 students at the University of Washington, all of
whom were registered voters. 78 One of the questions concerned crossracial identification:
Two women are walking to school one morning, one of them is an
Asian and the other white. Suddenly, two men, one black and one
white, jump into their path and attempt to grab their purses. Later,
the women are shown photographs of known purse snatchers in the
area. Which statement best describes your view of the women's ability to identify the purse snatchers?
(a) Both the Asian and the white woman will find the white man
harder to identify than the black man.
(b) The white woman will find the black man more difficult to identify than the white man.
(c) The Asian woman will have an easier time than the white woman
making an accurate identification of both men.
(d) The white woman will find the black man easier to identify than
79
the white man.
Only fifty-eight percent of the subjects chose (b), the correct answer; it is
notable that thirteen percent of the subjects selected alternative (d), indicating that they thought the white woman would find the black man
easier to identify than the white man.8 0
Rahaim and Brodsky asked a similar question of forty-five practicing lawyers and twenty-eight sociologically representative lay residents
of a southern community.8 1 Only thirty-nine percent of the laymen selected the correct answer; although the lawyers were more successful,
more than forty percent responded incorrectly. 2 The study posed four
other cross-racial identification questions, each of which concerned the
77
E. LoFrus, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 172-73 (1979); A. YARMEY, PSYCHOLOGY OF
EYEWrrNESS TESTIMONY 100-02 (1979); Rahaim & Brodsky, supra note 49, at 11.
78 See E. LoFrus, supra note 77, at 172-73.
79 Id at 172.
80 Id at 172-73.
81 Rahaim and Brodsky, sura note 49, at 13, asked the following question:

82

Two women are walking to work one morning. One of them is an Oriental American, the other white. Suddenly two men, one black and one white,
jump out and grab their purses. Each man is in view of both women for the
same amount of time. Later, the two women are asked to look at photographs
of known purse snatchers. Which statement below best describes your view of
the women's ability to identify the purse snatchers?
a. Both women will find both men equally difficult to identify.
b. The white woman will find the black man more difficult to identify
than the white man. [This is the correct answer].
c. The Asian woman will find it more difficult to identify the black
man than the white man.
d. The white woman will find the white man more difficult to identify
than the black man.
Id at 9.
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83
effect of attitudes and experience on cross-racial recognition ability.
Overall, an average of twenty-four percent of the laymen and twentytwo percent of the lawyers chose the empirically correct answers to the
five items on race. 84 Because each question had only four alternative

83 Rahaim and Brodsky asked the following additional questions (the correct answer is
marked with an asterisk):
[1]. Two white men are held up by a black man on their way home from
work. One of the victims hates blacks and the other neither hates nor loves
blacks. In your view which victim will find it easier to identify the hold-up
man?
a. The victim who hates blacks will find it easier to identify the black
hold-up man.
b. The victim who neither loves nor hates blacks will find it easier to
identify the black hold-up man.
*c. Both victims will have the same ability to identify the black hold-up
man.

d. The victim who neither hates nor loves blacks will find it easier to
identify the black hold-up man but the other victim will more clearly
remember the details of the crime.
[2]. Two black men are robbed by a white man on their way to a ball game.
One of the black men grew up around whites and has several white friends.
The other black man has had almost no contact with whites. Which statement below best describes your view of the abilities of the men to identify the
robber?
a. The victim who has white friends will recognize the robber more
easily.
b. The victim who has little contact with whites will find it easier to
identify the robber.
*c. They will have the same amount of difficulty recognizing the
robber.
d. The victim with white friends will find it easier to recognize the
robber, but the other victim will remember more of the details of the
crime.
[3] A white man observes an Oriental woman and a black woman hold up a
grocery store. Which statement best describes your view of his ability to recognize the criminals?
a. He will recognize the black woman more easily than the Oriental
woman.
*b. He will recognize the Oriental woman more easily than the black
woman.
c. He will have equal ability to recognize the two women.
d. It will depend upon whether he is usually around blacks or
Orientals.
[4] A Chinese American man is robbed by a white man and black man.
Which statement below best describes your view of his ability to identify the
robbers?
a. He will have equal ability to identify the robbers.
*b. He will find it easier to identify the black robber.
c. He will find it easier to identify the white robber.
d. It will depend on whether he has more experience with blacks or
whites.
Id at 13-15.
84 Id at 11.
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answers, pure guessing would have produced a slightly higher rate of
correct answers.
The third study asked fifty-four prosecutors to rate the importance
85
Of
of various witness attributes to the outcome of the prosecution.
thirty-two possible attributes, the prosecutors judged "same race as the
defendant" to be twenty-ninth in importance. 86
Although it seems reasonably certain that misconceptions about
cross-racial identification are common, it is difficult to predict how frequently juries would decide cases differently if they had access to the
empirically correct information on the problems of cross-racial identification. No study has investigated the impact on jury deliberations of
providing this information. Three studies, however, have explored how
jury deliberations in mock trials are affected by expert testimony on
sources of identification error.8 7 Taken together, these three investigations demonstrate that, at least in a laboratory setting, expert testimony
affects the beliefs and judgments of individual jurors, increases jury deliberation time, and modestly increases the number of acquittals and
hung juries. 88
D.

Exacerbating Factors in White Victim/Black Defendant Cases

As demonstrated in part A, the own-race effect is strongest and
most consistent where white subjects attempt to identify black faces. If
this data is externally valid,8 9 the risk of misidentification is greatest
where the victim is white and the defendant is black. At least three
factors may exacerbate the own-race effect and increase the chance of
wrongful conviction in these cases.
First, pretrial identification procedures are likely to be less fair for
black defendants than for white defendants. Line-ups and photo arrays
are unfair to the extent that they point to the defendant, either because
the other participants differ markedly from the defendant, or because
only the defendant resembles the victim's initial description of the per85 See A. YARMEY, supra note 77, at 1000-2, reporting the substance of a paper presented
at the 1975 meeting of the American Psychological Association by P. Lavrakas and L.
Bickman entitled What Makes a Good Witness? The study asked the prosecutors to rate the
importance of each attribute on a scale of one to five, with "one" corresponding to totally
unrelated; "two" usually unrelated; "three" somewhat related; "four" usually related; and
"five" corresponding to very related. Id at 101.
86 Id The mean rating for this attribute, on the scale reported was only 1.878. Id
87
Hosch, Beck & McIntyre, Inftuence of Expert Testimony Regarding Eyewitness Accuracy on
Jug Decisions, 4 LAw & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 287 (1980); Loftus, Impact of Expert Psychological
Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identifcation, 65 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 9 (1980);
Wells, Lindsay & Tousignant, Eects of Expert PsychologicalAdvice on Human Performance in Judging the Validity of Eyewitness Testimony, 4 LAw & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 275 (1980).
88 Hosch, A Comparison of Three Studies ofthe Influence ofExpert Testimony onJurors, 4 LAW &
HUMAN BEHAVIOR 297, 300-01 (1980).

89

See supra part I.A.2.
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petrator. The more unfair the line-up or photo array, the greater the
defendant's chance of being erroneously identified. 90
One researcher has argued that the race of the photo array or lineup constructor significantly affects the fairness of the procedure. 9 1 The
existence of the own-race effect suggests that line-up and photo array
constructors will producefairer line-ups when the defendant is a member
of their own race because they are more sensitive to similarities and dissimilarities among members of their own race. Because most police officers and district attorneys are white, absent a conscious policy of
assigning line-ups and photo arrays of black defendants to a black person, black defendants typically will be placed in less fair line-ups than
white defendants.
Preliminary research on the accuracy of the "photo-fit" system, a
widely used recall method comprised of numerous sketches of five facial
features, supports the conclusion that identification procedures are less
fair for blacks. Witnesses are asked to select the sketches that best fit
their memory of the perpetrator's face. The male photo-fit system contains Caucasian and Afro-Asian features. Ellis, Davies, and McMurran
asked black and white subjects to construct photo-fits of previously seen
black and white faces. 9 2 Both white and black subjects made more accurate photo fits for whites than blacks. 93 The authors suggested two
possible explanations for this result. First, the Afro-Asian kit contained
fewer alternative facial features than the Caucasian kit. 94 Second, the
photo-fit system was originally developed for the reconstruction of white
faces, which may have biased the manner in which the face is segmented
and the features selected. 95
A second factor likely to exacerbate the wrongful conviction rate in
white victim/black defendant cases is the phenomenon of expectancy.
As Allport first reported in 1965, white witnesses expect to see black
criminals.96 This expectation is so strong that whites may observe an
interracial scene in which a white person is the aggressor, yet remember
the black person as the aggressor. Subsequent studies have replicated
90 See Brigham, Perspectiveson the Impact oLineup Composition, Race and Witness Confidence on
Identification Accuracy, 4 LAW & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 315, 318-19 (1980) (citing Malpass, Effective Size and Defendant Bias in Eyewitness Identification Lineups (1980) (unpublished manuscript)); Lindsay & Wells, What PriceJustice? Exploring the Relationship of Line-Up Fairness to
Identifcation Accuracy, 4 LAW & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 303 (1980).
91 Brigham, supra note 90, at 318-19.
92 See Ellis, Davies & McMurran, Recall of White and Black Faces By White and Black Wit-

nesses Using the Photoft System, 21 HUMAN FACTORS 55 (1979).
93 Id at 58.
94 Id
95

Id

96

G. ALLPORT & L. POSTMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RUMOR 75 (1965). Allport

showed subjects a picture of several people on a subway car, including a white man holding a
razor and apparently arguing with a black man. Over half of the subjects reported that the
black man held the razor. Id.
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Allport's findings. 9 7
The third exacerbating factor is related to expectancy: when the
evidence is sparse, jurors are more likely to attribute guilt to defendants
of a different race.98 Jurors are also more likely to convict when the
victim is of their own race. 99 Because most juries are predominantly
white, 100 in marginal evidence conditions black defendants will tend to
be acquitted less often than white defendants and black defendants with
white victims will tend to be acquitted least often. Although detailed
consideration of the expectancy and guilt attribution phenomena is beyond the scope of this article, it is worth noting that these systemic biases against black defendants may interact with the own-race effect in
many cases.
II
THE ADEQUACY OF EXISTING LEGAL PROTECTIONS

The own-race effect would be of little concern if defense counsel
had adequate techniques for revealing and neutralizing the errors it produces. Unfortunately, none of the three traditional protections against
erroneous identification-suppression hearings, cross-examination, and
closing argument-adequately protect against cross-racial recognition
impairment.
A.

Suppression Hearings

Two important safeguards against erroneous identifications focus
on procedure. In order to eliminate deliberate and accidental suggestiveness in identification procedures, the Supreme Court has recognized
the defendant's right to counsel at post-indictment line-ups, 10 ' and imposed a due process fairness requirement on all identification proceed02
ings, including uncounseled photo arrays and preindictment line-ups.'
Courts enforce both protections by suppression hearings. The suppression court will suppress a pretrial identification if it finds that the defendant's right to counsel was violated or that the proceeding was so
unreasonably suggestive as to lead to the likelihood of irreparable mis97 See, e.g., Brigham, Ethnic Stereotypes, 76 PSYCHOLOGY BULL. 15 (1971).
98 Ugwuegbu, Racial and Evidential Factorsin JurorAttribution of Legal Responsibility, 15 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 133, 143 (1979); see also Gleason & Harris, Race, Socioeconomic Status and Perceived Similarity As Determinants ofJudgments By SimulatedJurors, 3 Soc.
BEHAVIOR & PERSONALITY 175, 178-79 (1975); McGlynn, Megas & Benson, Sex and Race as
FactorsAfecting the Attribution of Insanity in A Murder Trial, 93 J. PSYCHOLOGY 93, 98 (1976)
(where evidence on intent is ambiguous, black male defendants in murder trials less successful
in asserting insanity plea than white male defendants).
99 Feild, Rape Trials andJuror'sDecisons, 3 LAW & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 261, 272 (1979).
100 See J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES 311-30 app. G (1977) (Racial
Statistics).
101 See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
102 See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 298 (1967).
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identification.10 3 The court then will consider whether subsequent identifications have an "independent basis"; if the court finds no
independent basis, it also will preclude an in-court identification. 104
It is not clear whether suppression hearings enforcing the right to
counsel ("Wade hearings") and due process ("Stovall hearings") adequately protect criminal identifications from errors caused by suggestiveness. 10 5 Certainly suppression hearings do little to offset errors
stemming from cross-racial recognition impairment. Either counsel or a
subsequent due process hearing can ensure that the defendant is not the
only black (or white) person in the line-up.10 6 But because the aim of
suppression hearings is to uncover misidentification caused by police
misconduct, there will be no investigation of the recognition ability of
the witness in cases where the police have not used suggestive procedures. Even where authorities have used suggestive procedures, courts
will probably ignore the question of cross-racial recognition impairment.10 7 The Supreme Court's criteria for determining whether an impermissible pretrial procedure has tainted an in-court identification
include such factors as the witness's prior opportunity to observe the
criminal; the length of time between the crime and the identification
proceeding; discrepancies between pre-identification descriptions and
the defendant's appearance; and prior failures to identify the defendant.108 The witness's individual recognition impairment just does not fit
the focus of suppression hearings.
B.

Cross-Examination of the Eyewitnesses
The Supreme Court recently proclaimed that "the time-honored

103 See id.at 302; Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272-74 (1967); United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 21 , 239-42 (1967).
104
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. at 272-74; United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. at 242.
105 See generally Levine & Tapp, The Pgychology of Criminal Identifications." The Gap From
Wade to Kirby, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1079 (1973) (arguing that procedural reforms initiated by
Wade and Stovall have been eroded by later decision); Quinn, In the Wake of Wade: The Dimensions of Eyewitness Identiftation Cases, 42 U. CoLo. L. REv. 135 (1970) (problem of misidentification will never completely be solved, because errors in judgment are inevitable). Cf
Uelmen, Testing the Assumptions of Neil v. Biggers: An Experiment in Eyewitness Identification, 16
CRIM. L. BULL. 358 (1980) (arguing that Court's attempt in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188
(1972), to isolate five factors by which to assess eyewitness identification was unsuccessful).
106 See People v. Menchaca, 264 Cal. App. 2d 642, 645, 70 Cal. Rptr. 843, 844-45 (1968);
People v. Hogan, 264 Cal. App. 2d 254, 259-60, 70 Cal. Rptr. 448, 452-53 (1968); People v.
Graves, 263 Cal. App. 2d 719, 741-42, 70 Cal. Rptr. 509, 524 (1968).
107
For example, in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 298 (1967), the Court upheld an extremely suggestive hospital room show-up without mention of the cross-racial nature of the
identification. The only reference by the Court to witness-defendant racial congruence was in
Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 115 (1977) where the Court implied that because both
witness and defendant were black, this alleviated concern that the scanty prior description
would have fit large numbers of black men in the area. See also United States v. Thomas, 463
F.2d 314, 315 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (noting racial similarity as a factor increasing reliability).
108 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 241 (1967).
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process of cross-examination [is] the device best suited to determine the
trustworthiness of testimonial evidence."' 0 9 Most courts will not allow
defense counsel to introduce expert testimony on the own-race effect on
the ground that cross-examination is the proper way to elicit information on a witness's credibility.1 0 Nevertheless, cross-examination is extremely unlikely to reveal cross-racial recognition impairment.
The value of cross-examination lies in its capacity to elicit facts
known but not disclosed by the witness. First, cross-examination can
test veracity; if the witness is lying, careful cross-examination may reveal
inconsistencies or a motive to fabricate. But if the witness honestly believes that he has a good memory for other-race faces, when in fact he
does not, the best cross-examination will be to no avail. Because accuracy of other-race face recognition appears to be wholly unrelated to
confidence,'' many witnesses who suffer from cross-racial recognition
impairment will deny it and the jury will preceive only certainty and
sincerity.
Second, cross-examination may probe some sources of unreliability.
If a witness honestly believes that he is telling the truth, it is nevertheless
possible to elicit additional facts that cast doubt on his ability to discern
the truth. Was the witness paying attention to the subject of his testimony or was he absorbed in another task? Is his eyesight adequate?
Was he intoxicated or hysterical? Because these kinds of additional facts
affect reliability, a jury can use them to infer the probability that the
witness is reporting an accurate observation.
This second facet of cross-examination is also an ineffective tool for
detecting cross-racial recognition impairment. Because there are no
t2
known and commonly understood correlates for the own-race effect,"
ordinary cross-examination will never elicit facts from which the jury
can infer the impairment. This problem may be exacerbated by attempts of the prosecutor to elicit facts on direct examination that erroneously convey an inference of reliability. For example, in a recent
Michigan case, the prosecutor asked a white eyewitness about his professional experience with black people;" i3 the court found no error in these
questions, reasoning that "[i]n an interracial identification situation, evidence of the witness's prior contacts with another race is properly admitWatkins v. Sowder, 449 U.S. 341, 349 (1981).
See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 97 Ill.
App. 3d 1055, 1069-70, 418 N.E.2d 768, 775-76
(1981); People v. Dixon, 87 Ill.
App. 3d 814, 818, 410 N.E.2d 252, 256 (1980); State v. Reynolds, 230 Kan. 532, 534, 639 P.2d 461, 464 (1982).
111 See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
1 12
See supra part I.B. As discussed above, Goldstein and Chance have deduced some
evidence that lack of childhood interracial contact may explain the own-race effect. Ifjurors
remain unaware that interracial experience must come early in order to improve cross-racial
recognition ability, cross-examination that shows adult interracial contact will be
counterproductive.
''3
People v. Flinnon, 78 Mich. App. 380, 260 N.W.2d 106 (1977).
109
110
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ted to show the reliability of the in-court identification."' 14 The juror
perception studies reveal that many jurors would agree with the court's
reasoning and accept the evidence of interracial experience even though
the empirical studies show such an inference to be incorrect.' 1 5
Because the inadequacy of cross-examination results in part from
the witness's ignorance of his own impairment, the appropriate remedy
might seem to be testing the witness for the own-race effect, informing
him of the results, and then proceeding with ordinary cross-examination. This is easier said than done. A prosecution witness would be free
to take the recognition tests upon a defense request, but he would be
unlikely to do so; it is a rare prosecution witness who will agree to even a
simple interview with defense counsel. 1 6 Defense counsel might move
the court for an order compelling an unwilling witness to undergo the
test, but this would probably be futile. First, it is unclear whether most
11 7
courts would have the authority to order this kind of examination.
Second, those courts that have ordered physical or mental examinations
of complaining witnesses have always required a particularized and
compelling reason for such an examination; mere speculation about incapacity has not sufficed." 8 And third, no appellate court has found
that defendants are entitled to such orders as of right; rather, the decision whether to grant such orders is within the trial court's discretion."l 9
These obstacles cannot be surmounted by devising some test with
which to confront the witness while he is on the stand. It is possible to
"measure" a witness's eyesight by cross-examination, because an ordinary question will suffice: "What am I holding in my hand?" Similarly,
it is possible to gauge acuteness of hearing by asking any question in a
soft tone of voice. In contrast, defense counsel cannot probe interracial
recognition ability by merely asking a question or even a series of questions. As an alternative method, defense counsel might try to show the
witness a number of photographs, and then, after a substantial delay,
recall the witness, show him more photographs, and ask which ones he
recognized. Such a demonstration, however, would be an in-court experiment, and therefore subject to the basic requirement applicable to
114 Id at 389, 260 N.W.2d at 110.
115 See supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
116 Defense counsel has no right to interview prosecution witnesses if they do not want to
be interviewed. See, e.g., United States v. Fink, 502 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'don othergrounds,
425 U.S. 80 (1976); Commonwealth v. St. Pierre, 387 N.E.2d 1135 (Mass. 1979); see also
United States v. White, 454 F.2d 435 (7th Cir. 1971) (government may inform its witness of
right to refuse defense counsel's request for an interview).
1I7 The Federal Rules of Evidence, like many state codes, make no provison for such an
examination. Nevertheless, there may be an "inherent" power to order one; rule 35 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does make such a provision. But cf. Wedmore v. State, 237
Ind. 212, 143 N.E.2d 649 (1957) (no inherent power to order such examination).
118 See Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 1433 (1968).
119 See United States v. Skillman, 442 F.2d 542 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 833 (1971).
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all experimental evidence: similarity of relevant conditions. 120 This requirement often frustrates proposed courtroom experiments 2 1 and
would seem impossible to meet in testing other-race recognition impairment. Because no courtroom experiment could recreate the emotions
that witnessing a crime engenders, and because the emotions of the witness often affect recall, the requirement of similarity of relevant conditions would not be satisfied.122 Thus, it seems that none of the "timehonored" forms of cross-examination can adequately elicit cross-racial
recognition impairment.
C.

Closing Arguments

Just as courts suggest cross-examination when defense counsel proffer expert testimony, they respond to requests for jury instructions with
another conventional panacea: judges rule that jury instructions explaining the own-race effect are unnecessary because defense counsel
can address the issue in his closing argument. This remedy, however, is
also problematic.
The first problem is that courts may consider statements about
cross-racial recognition impairment racially inflammatory and thus prohibit them. The earliest cases in which the racial component of identification accuracy was an issue involved black defendants and black
witnesses. 123 When prosecutors argued that an identification was particularly reliable because witness and accused were of the same race, the
124
New York courts condemned their arguments as inflammatory.
The rationale for these decisions came from a line of cases in which
the courts disapproved argument that same-race accusations are more
truthful than cross-racial accusations:
The vice of such an argument is not only that it is predicated on a
false and illogical premise, but more important it is divisive: it seeks to
separate the racial origin of witnesses in the minds of the jury, and to
encourage the weighing of testimony on the basis of racial similarity
or dissimilarity of witnesses. The argument offends the democratic
and logical principle that race, creed or nationality, in themselves,
25
provide no reason for believing or disbelieving a witness' testimony.1

120

See C.

MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EvIDENCE § 215, at 536 (2d ed.

1972).
121
122

Id at n.96.
The burden of proving similar conditions is on the proponent of the evidence. Id

§ 202, at 485 n.14.
123 People v. Williams, 40 A.D.2d 812, 338 N.Y.S.2d 221 (1972); People v. Fisher, 19
A.D.2d 613, 241 N.Y.S.2d 217 (1963); People v. Burris, 19 A.D.2d 557, 241 N.Y.S.2d 75
(1963).
124 Id
125 People v. Hearns, 18 A.D.2d 922, 923, 238 N.Y.S.2d 173, 173 (1963); see also People v.
Green, 89 A.D.2d 874, 874, 453 N.Y.S.2d 228, 229 (1982) (citing Hams),; People v. Burney,
20 A.D.2d 617, 617, 244 N.Y.S.2d 1012, 1012 (1963) (quoting Hearns).
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Although other courts concur in this reasoning where the challenged
arguments concern the veracity of an accusation, 126 New York appears
to be the only jurisdiction that has included arguments about the increased accuracy of a same-race identification within the prohibition
against racially inflammatory arguments.
Two jurisdictions have explicitly approved counsel's references during closing arguments to the racial component in cross-racial identification cases. In a recent Kentucky case, the prosecutor stated that "it's
hard for me to tell people of the Negro race apart. "127 The reviewing
court found no error because "[the prosecutor] was merely trying to explain the prosecuting witness's difficulties in identifying one of her assailants." 128 In another recent case, the Louisiana Supreme Court
rejected appellate counsel's complaint that trial counsel should not have
challenged the identification by repeatedly referring to the defendant as
the only black person in the courtroom. 129 The court held that such
references to race were permissible because they did not appeal to
130
prejudice.
Two other reported cases implicitly approve arguments addressing
the reliability of cross-racial identifications. 13 1 Whether or not such arguments should be completely proscribed by the rules against inflammatory racial comments, the Kentucky case makes it clear how easy it is
for an advocate to stray from purely factual arguments about cross-racial accuracy into questionable innuendo. Perhaps this is only a minor
pitfall in relying on closing arguments; with some practice, trial courts
may become adept at sifting the wheat from the chaff.
A second and perhaps more intractable difficulty with relying on
closing arguments to address cross-racial identification impairment is
the lack of factual foundation for such arguments. Both defense attorneys and prosecutors are limited to arguments of facts in evidence or
inferences from those facts. 132 Certainly defense counsel may call to the
jury's attention the racial dissimilarity of the witness and defendant. He
may also ask the jury if they believe such an identification is reliable.
But defense counsel has no foundation for an affirmative statement that
a cross-racial identification is much less reliable than a same-race identi126
127

See Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 303, 322-69 (1953).
Patterson v. Commonwealth, 555 S.W.2d 607, 610 (Ky. App. 1977).

128

Id

129

State v. McMorris, 343 So. 2d 1011 (La. 1977).

130

Id

at 1016.

McFarland v. Smith, 611 F.2d 414, 416-17 (2d Cir. 1979); Haynes v. McKendrick,
131
481 F.2d 152, 154 (2d Cir. 1973).
132 See, e.g., People v. Ashwal, 39 N.Y.2d 105, 109, 347 N.E.2d 564, 566-67, 383 N.Y.S.2d
204, 206-07 (1976). See generally Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct By Prosecutorsand TriaiJudges,
50 TEx. L. REV. 629, 633 (1972); Vess, Walking a Tghtrope: A Survey of Limitations in the ProsecuClosing Argument, 64J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 22 (1973); ABA Standards, Prosecution
tor's
and Defense Functions §§ 3-5.8, 4-7.8 (2d ed. 1979).
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fication; such a statement would be an assertion of facts not in evidence.
Upon objection, the court properly would tell the jury to disregard it. 133
Argument concerning the likelihood that this witness was affected
by the own-race effect would be even more constrained. Suppose that a
white witness called by the prosecutor testifies on direct examination
that he had lived in an integrated neighborhood for five years and felt
no prejudice toward blacks. Defense counsel could not claim in his closing argument that this experience was irrelevant to the likelihood of error; without the foundation of expert testimony, he would be asserting
facts not in evidence. Again, the trial court properly would sustain an
objection to such an argument.
Even if the prosecutor failed to object to statements in closing argument about the magnitude and correlates of the own-race effect, or if the
court erroneously overruled his objections, such statements are likely to
be unpersuasive. If the jury correctly perceives the role of defense counsel, it probably will interpret these statements as mere adversarial hyperbole. Even if some jurors are impressed by these arguments, they may
feel obliged to ignore them because there is no support in the testimonial
or real evidence for defense counsel's claims and the trial court has instructed them that the statements of counsel are not evidence.
Of the existing protections against misidentification, the primary
safeguard, suppression hearings, is totally unsuited to uncovering errors
produced by the own-race effect. Despite their potential value in revealing identification errors, cross-examination and closing argument
are also ineffective because the jury is not informed about the existence
and nature of the own-race effect. If we take the risk of cross-racial identification errors seriously, additional protective measures are necessary.
III
DEVELOPING ADDITIONAL SAFEGUARDS

A.

Extreme Measures

Some commentators include outright exclusion as a possible rem1 34
edy for the inherent untrustworthiness of identification evidence.
The courts could easily construct a mechanism for broader exclusion:
merely expand the due process test of Stovall v. Denno 135 to include all
cases where the relative value of the testimony is so small that its admission would mislead the jury regardless of the source of the unreliability.
But most commentators seem to discuss this "solution" merely as a rhetorical device for strengthening the appeal of the individual author's fa133
Cf. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974) (prosecutor's comments on matters not in evidence rendered harmless error by trial court's instruction to jury to disregard
them).
134
See, e.g., Note, supra note 75, at 1000.
135
388 U.S. 293 (1967).
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vored reform.1 36 The remedy of outright exclusion is too drastic for
courts to seriously consider it: in cases where additional evidence of the
defendant's guilt exists, exclusion would thwart rather than advance accurate factfinding. Because many cross-racial identifications are reliable, outright exclusion is also an inappropriate tool for specifically
addressing the own-race effect. Furthermore, a rule excluding only crossracial identifications might lead to an increase in interracial crime.
A second extreme measure, the requirement of corroboration, has
some serious advocates.137 Although corroboration requirements have
38
been imposed for particular offenses and particular types of witnesses,1
no court or legislature has deemed it necessary to corroborate eyewitness
testimony. Such a corroboration requirement would create the difficult
practical problem of deciding what constitutes adequate corroboration.
More importantly, however, the costs of this requirement are prohibitive. Some uncorroborated identifications are highly reliable, for example, those in which the witness was acquainted with the defendant prior
to the crime. As with outright exclusion, imposing the requirement of
corroboration only in cross-racial identification cases seems both drastic
and maladroit. Again, the circumstances of some cross-racial identifications will make them very reliable, yet a rigid rule of corroboration
would allow clearly guilty defendants to escape conviction. And again,
the selective imposition of this requirement might generate more interracial crime.
Whatever the abstract merits of exclusion or corroboration, neither
remedy is likely to be universally adopted and both are inappropriate
for selective application to cross-racial identifications. An alternative
approach that develops standards for the introduction of expert testimony and the delivery of jury instructions is more fruitful both because
the means are less drastic and because they can be tailored to the problem of the own-race effect.
B.

Expert Testimony
Many commentators, including several psychologists, have pro-

136

Note, supra note 75, at 1000-0 1; Note, Eyewitness Idenifcation Testimony and the Needfor

CautionagyJugy Instructionsfor Criminal Cases, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 1387, 1400-02 (1982).
137 See, e.g., M. Hotrs,FROM EVIDENCE TO PROOF 26 (1956); Goldstein, The Fallibilityof
the Eyewitness: PsychologicalEvidence, in PSYCHOLOGY IN THE LEGAL PROCESS 223 (B. Sales ed.
1977); P. WALL, supra note 12, at 182-93; Comment, PossibleSafeguards Against Mistaken Identification By Eyewitnesses, 2 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 552, 557 n.23 (1955). Most advocates of the corroboration requirement would merely prohibit convictions based upon a single eyewitness
identification. Goldstein has proposed the stiffer requirement that eyewitness identification
testimony be inadmissible where it is the only class of evidence available in a criminal trial.
Goldstein, supra, at 237-41.
138

See generaly 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 2036-75 (3d

ed. 1940) (discussing corroboration requirements for certain kinds of witnesses and in various
civil and criminal cases).
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posed the use of expert testimony to inform jurors about the psychological data on identification.1 39 Courts have responded cautiously,
acknowledging that some experimental findings may have evidentiary
value, but refusing carte blanche admissibility. Whether or not courts
should always permit expert testimony on all sources of identification
error, the balance between potential prejudice and probative value favors admissibility of data on the own-race effect.
1. The Proposed Content and Presentation ofExpert Testimony on the
Own-Race Effect
One way to bridge the gap between psychologists' and laymen's
knowledge of the own-race effect would be to allow the defense to call
an expert witness whenever the prosecution presents evidence that includes a cross-racial identification. Because the expert is unable to determine whether the witness's memory was actually distorted by the
own-race effect, he would not be able to venture an opinion on the correctness of the identification at issue. The expert would instead explain
the methodology and findings of the own-race effect research. 140 In
cases where the defendant is black or Asian and the witness white, the
expert would report consistent findings of cross-racial impairment; in
cases where the defendant is white and the witness Asian or black, the
expert would report split results; and in cases involving a Hispanic or
Native American defendant (or witness), the expert would report all of
the own-race effect studies, because there are no laboratory studies directly on point. The expert would then describe the strength of the effect, explaining how much a cross-racial identification increases the
likelihood of error, but cautioning that not all cross-racial identifications
are inaccurate and that not all persons exhibit the own-race effect. The
expert would further explain that neither positive attitudes toward other
races nor interracial experience precludes cross-racial recognition impairment. Finally, he would stress that an entirely confident and honest
139 See, e.g., Clifford, Eyewitness Testimony: The Bridging of a Credibility Gap, in PSYCHOLOGY, LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES 167, 180-81 (D. Farrington, K. Hawkins & S. Lloyd-Bostock eds. 1979); Loftus & Monahan, Trialby Data, 35 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 270, 273-74 (1980);
Wells, Lindsay & Tousignant, Effects of Expert PAychological Advice on Human PerformanceinJudging the Validity ofEyewitness Testimony, 4 LAW & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 275, 285 (1980); Comment,
Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Perception, 82 DICK. L. REv. 465, 484-85 (1978); Note, supra note

75, at 1006 & n.173.
140
[The psychologist's] testimony is designed to give the jury additional information to use when assessing the credibility of a particular witness. His testimony does not indicate whether or not any particular witness is telling the
truth. It is limited to describing ... scientific phenomena by way of citing
literature and experiments in the field of psychology and to indicating the
extent to which such phenomena might have affected an eyewitness identification in the case.
Fishman & Loftus, Expert PschologicalTestimony on Eyewitness Identic&ation, 4 LAW & PSYCHOLOGY REv. 87, 95-96 (1978).
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identification might nevertheless reflect own-race effect error, explaining
that subjects in laboratory settings were unable to predict or perceive

their own impairment.
The prosecution, of course, could cross-examine the expert. He
might draw attention to the fact that the strength, if not the existence of
the own-race effect infield settings is unclear. If the expert had not been
candid or complete, cross-examination would elict that the data reflect

group tendencies, that individuals may or may not experience cross-racial recognition impairment, and that the expert could not say whether
the eyewitness in this case was affected by this tendency. The prosecutor
might also want to explore the lack of any well supported theory explaining the own-race effect.
The prosecutor would also have the option of calling his own expert
in rebuttal. Under ordinary circumstances, however, he would be unlikely to do so. Because expert testimony on the own-race effect would
describe a scientific phenomenon rather than assess a particular witness,
divergence in the testimony of different experts would be unlikely. On
occasion, however, an ill-informed, biased, or unethical defense expert
witness might compel the prosecutor to present the jury with a second

perspective.
2.

The JudicialResponse

a. GeneralStandardsfor the Admission of Expert Testimony. The variety
of evidentiary rules in state and federal courts share two central principles: no fact is admissible unless it has rational probative value on an
issue in dispute and every fact that has such value is admissible absent a
countervailing and overriding policy.14 ' Thus courts should allow expert testimony when it provides information relevant to disputed legal
issues and is not outweighed by other policy considerations. The Federal Rule of Evidence 142 on the admissibility of expert testimony accordingly provides: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."

43

The application of traditional expert testimony criteria to psychological testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identifications is receiving increased appellate attention, but the decisions generally have been
unfavorable to the defendant. The leading opinion is the Ninth CirSee 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 138, §§ 9, 10.
The significance of the Federal Rules of Evidence is not limited to their application in
federal courts; they serve as a model for many state courts. 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5007 (1977 & Supp. 1982).
143 FED. R. EVID. 702.
141
142
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cult's 1973 decision in United States v. Amaral. 144 The court found no
abuse of discretion in the trial judge's exclusion of psychological testimony on "the effect of stress on perception and. . . the [general] unreliability of eye-witness identification."' 145 The opinion's significance lies
in its reasoning. The Amaral court first outlined four criteria for the
admissibility of expert testimony: (1) a qualified expert; (2) a proper
subject matter; (3) conformity to a generally accepted explanatory theory; and (4) probative value outweighing prejudicial effect. 146 The
court assigned the balancing implicit in the fourth test to the "broad
discretion" of the trial judge, absent a "manifestly erroneous" determination. 14 7 Stressing the potential of effective cross-examination for revealing inconsistencies in eyewitness testimony, and the lack of any
inconsistencies in the testimony of the witnesses in that case, the Amaral
court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's refusal to admit
the proffered expert testimony.148
Several circuits have adopted the Amaral guidelines. 149 Under these
guidelines, no federal court of appeals has yet found a trial court's refusal to admit expert psychological testimony on identification to be reversible error.' 50 A majority of the state courts hold that a trial court
does not abuse its discretion by refusing to admit expert psychological
51
testimony on eyewitness identifications.'
Although some cases simply find no abuse of the trial court's discretion, 152 many decisions go further, ruling the proffered evidence inadmissible for failure to satisfy the second Amaral requirement, a proper
subject matter. The proper subject matter standard has been variously
144
145
146
147

488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973).
Id at 1153.
Id

Id at 1152.
Id at 1153.
149 See, e.g., United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 641-42 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
1008 (1982); United States v. Sims, 617 F.2d 1371, 1374-75 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 382-83 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v. Brown, 501 F.2d 146, 150-51
(9th Cir. 1974), rev'don other grounds sub noma.
United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975).
150 See supra note 149; see also United States v. Watson, 587 F.2d 365, 368-69 (7th Cir.
1978) (affirming exclusion under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 of expert testimony on crossracial recognition on ground that "work in that field still remains inadequate" to assist jury),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979); United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 1048, 1053-54 (10th Cir.
1976) (affirming exclusion of expert testimony on limitations of eyewitness identifications on
ground that testimony would invade province ofjury), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1100 (1977); State
v. Helterbridle, 301 N.W.2d 545, 547 (Minn. 1980) (holding trial court did not abuse discretion in refusing to admit expert testimony on unreliability of eyewitness identifications).
151 See,e.g., State v. Valencia, 118 Ariz. 136, 138, 575 P.2d 335, 357 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977);
Dyas v. United States, 376 A.2d 827, 831-32 (D.C. 1977); State v. Warren, 230 Kan. 385, 395,
635 P.2d 1236, 1243 (1981); State v. Helterbridle, 301 N.W.2d 545, 547 (Minn. 1980); Hampton v. State, 92 Wis. 2d 450, 461, 285 N.W.2d 868, 873 (1979).
152 See, e.g., United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 384 (lst Cir. 1979) ("Given the additional discretion to consider the balance of prejudice and probative value, we cannot say that
the trial court abused its discretion . .
").
148
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interpreted. The predominant interpretation requires that the expert's
testimony be beyond the knowledge of the average layperson.153 Courts

applying this interpretation frequently find that the proffered data on
the own-race effect is no more than common sense.154 The second common interpretation of proper subject matter is that the expert may not
invade the province of the jury. 155 In this view, expert psychological
testimony relating to the credibility of an eyewitness violates the policy
against expression of expert opinions on an "ultimate issue" to be determined by the trier of fact.' 5 6 A recent California case voices a more
drastic objection: "Evidence that under contrived test conditions, or
even in real life situations, certain persons totally unconnected with this
case, have been mistaken in their identity [sic] of individuals is no more
relevant than evidence that in other cases, witnesses totally unconnected
157
with this case have lied."'
The sole exception to this pattern of appellate court resistance is the
recent Arizona Supreme Court decision in State v. Chapple.158 Applying
the Amaral criteria, the Chapple court found "the unusual facts of this
case" required the admission of expert testimony on the reliability of
eyewitness identifications. 159 The proffered testimony in Chapple included scientific data on such factors as the trustworthiness of immediate and delayed identification; the effect of stress upon perception; the
problem of "unconscious transfer," "a phenomenon which occurs when
the witness confuses a person seen in one situation with a person seen in
a different situation"; 60 assimilation of post-event information and the
"feedback factor," where two eyewitnesses discuss what they saw and
thereby obtain a false sense of certainty; '61 and the relationship between
confidence and accuracy. Because each factor was relevant to the undisputed facts surrounding Chapple's identification, and because the average juror probably would be unaware of the effect of these factors on
memory, the court concluded that the evidence should have been
153

See, e.g., United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152-53 (9th Cir. 1973). Seegenerally

C. MCCORMICK, supra note 120, § 13 (discussing general requirement that subject matter "be
beyond the ken of the average layman").
154
See, e.g., United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152-53 (9th Cir. 1973); People v.
Dixon, 87 Ill.
App. 3d 814, 818, 410 N.E.2d 252, 256 (1980).
155 See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 501 F.2d 146, 150-51 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'don other
grounds sub noma.
United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975); People v. Johnson, 38 Cal. App.
3d 1, 6-7, 112 Cal. Rptr. 834, 837 (1974).
156
See People v. Johnson, 38 Cal. App. 3d 1, 6-7, 112 Cal. Rptr. 834, 837 (1974). In
Johnson, the court held that in the absence of evidence of a psychologically abnormal witness,
expert testimony would usurp the jury's task of determining the weight to be accorded to the
witness's testimony.
157
People v. Plasencia, 33 CRim. L. REP. (BNA) 2050, 2051 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
158
135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983).
159 Id at 296, 660 P.2d at 1223.
Id at 294, 660 P.2d at 1221.
160
161
Id
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963

admitted. 162

b. The Admission of Expert Testimony on the Own-Race Effect. Five appellate courts have specifically addressed the admissibility of expert testimony on cross-racial identification errors. The reasoning in these cases
varies, but the results are consistent: all five courts have upheld the trial
court's decision to exclude the testimony.
In the only federal case involving expert testimony on the own-race
effect, the trial court ruled the proffered testimony inadmissible on the
ground that it would not be of probative value to the jury. 163 The Seventh Circuit agreed with the trial judge, citing both "the circumstances
in this case involving prompt and positive identifications," and "the
[court's] belief that work in [the cross-racial identification] field still remains inadequate," as bases for concluding that the testimony would
164
have been of little use to the jury.
Two Illinois cases have also considered the issue. In the first, People
v. Dixon, 165 the defendant argued that the trial court's ruling prevented
the jury from properly weighing the credibility of the eyewitnesses
against the credibility of his alibi defense. 166 The record provided some
support for this contention: the witnesses' inability to give a precise
description of the perpetrator after the incident, a questionable identification of the defendant by one witness based on a one man show-up,
and the fact that the defendant was the only black man present during
the courtroom identification. 167 The court nevertheless concluded that
the trial court had correctly excluded the expert testimony because "the
trustworthiness of eyewitness observations is not generally beyond the
common knowledge and experience of the average juror."' 68 The court
supported this conclusion by quoting the expert's statements during the
offer of proof that "[w]e have all heard, I am sure, of the notion that to
whites all blacks look alike and all Asians look alike and similar folk
notions" and his later statement that his research supported the validity
of those beliefs. 169 "[M]oreover," the court noted, "defense counsel had
ample opportunity in cross-examination and argument to challenge the
identifications by the two eyewitnesses, and. . . took full advantage of
these opportunities."' 7 0 In the second Illinois case, the trial judge had
refused to admit expert testimony on the reliability of cross-racial identiId at 296, 660 P.2d at 1223.
United States v. Watson, 587 F.2d 365, 368 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub nom. Davis
v. United States, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979).
164 Id at 369.
165 87 IM. App. 3d 814, 410 N.E.2d 252 (1980).
166 Id at 818, 410 N.E.2d at 256.
162
163

167
168

Id

169

Id

170

Id at 818-19, 410 N.E.2d at 256.

Id
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fications because he thought it would both invade the province of and
confuse the jury without resolving any issues.17 1 The reviewing court
did not comment on the lower court's reasoning, but instead adopted
the two-pronged rationale of Dixon.: first, the trustworthiness of identification testimony is not beyond the ken of the average juror; and second,
questions concerning the accuracy of the identification were properly
relegated to cross-examination of the eyewitness and closing
72
argument. 1
The Kansas Supreme Court has relied on the same rationales for
rejecting expert testimony concerning cross-racial identifications. In
Slate v. Reynolds, 173 the court acknowledged that the cross-racial nature
of the identification was an important factor, but one "fully capable of
being elicited, and in fact [was] elicited, during other testimony." 74 In
another case apparently involving cross-racial identification, the same
court upheld the exclusion of expert testimony because Kansas law forbids expert opinions that "pass upon the credibility of witnesses or the
weight of disputed evidence."' 175 Such testimony would usurp the function of the jury, at least where the defendant makes no claim "that the
[witness] suffered from any specific organic or emotional disability that
76
would have affected the reliability of her identification."'
A published opinion of a New York trial court also rejects testimony on the reliability of cross-racial identification. 77 The court reasoned that the psychological evidence was insufficiently "reliable or
acceptable in the scientific community," and that its admission would
78
usurp the function of the jury.'
Of course, the reported opinions overstate judicial resistance to this
kind of testimony. Appellate courts confront the issue only in cases
where the trial judge has excluded the evidence and the defendant was
convicted. Because an acquittal can not be appealed, there will be no
occasion for appellate approval of the admission of the psychologist's
testimony; because trial court opinions are rarely reported, there will be
no official record of most cases in which lower courts have admitted
such testimony. The accounts of several psychologists working in the
field of identification suggest that the admission of evidence on the own79
race effect is not so rare as it is sporadic.
171 People v. Johnson, 97 Ill. App. 3d 1055, 1061, 423 N.E.2d 1206, 1211 (1981).
172 Id at 1069, 423 N.E.2d at 1216-17.
173 230 Kan. 532, 639 P.2d 461 (1982).
174 Id at 535, 639 P.2d at 464.
175 State v. Reed, 226 Kan. 519, 521, 601 P.2d 1125, 1128 (1979).
176 Id at 520, 601 P.2d at 1127.
177 People v. Brown, 117 Misc. 2d 587, 459 N.Y.S.2d 227 (Westchester County Ct. 1983).
178 Id at 594, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 232.
179 Robert Buckhout reports that he has testified as an expert witness on eyewitness identification in over 60 cases. Letter from Robert Buckhout to author (June 30, 1983) (on file at
Cornell Law Review). Although his records do not permit him to count the number of cases
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Ironically, one court in a civil case has acknowledged the admissibility of testimony on the own-race effect, but for a purpose other than
probing the reliability of a particular identification. In Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Members of Bridgeport Civil Service Commission, 180 the court
struck down a patrolman's entrance exam as racially discriminatory.
The test included a section requiring the memorization of eight sets of
mug shots, all of which were white. A psychologist's testimony, apparently unchallenged, that whites probably found it easier to distinguish
18 1
white faces than did blacks, contributed to the court's decision.
3.

MeetingJudicialObjections

The developing case law on the admissibility of expert testimony on
eyewitness identification forms a clear pattern. Although the appellate
courts have provided rough guidelines for admissibility, they have relied
on the trial courts' competent exercise of discretion to supply the details.
This leads to capricious and inconsistent decisions that admit testimony
in one case, then exclude it in the next. Commentators have criticized
the deferential stance of Amaral and its counterparts, arguing for blanket
admission of experimental psychologists' findings on the sources and
risks of misidentification; in their view, the field as a whole meets the
traditional criteria for the admission of expert testimony. 182 The courts
fear that capitulation will lead to a battery of psychologists testifying in
every criminal case involving an eyewitness identification, or worse, in
every case relying on testimonial evidence of any sort, for many of the
factors affecting the perception and memory of faces also affect the perception and memory of events. Appellate courts can avoid these extremes by systematically considering whether particularfactors affecting
the reliability of identifications meet the criteria outlined in United States
v. Amaral for admitting expert testimony: a qualified expert, proper subject matter, conformity to a generally accepted explanatory theory, and
probative value outweighing prejudicial effect. 18 3 If courts measure the
own-race effect data against these standards, they must conclude that
the standards are easily satisfied and that discretionary refusals to admit
expert testimony on that data are unwarranted.
that included testimony on the own-race effect, he states that he discussed it "many times."
Id Elizabeth Loftus also reports substantial experience testifying as an expert on eyewitness
identification. Letter from Elizabeth Loftus to author (July 3, 1983) (on file at Comell Law
Review). She also is unable to determine how many of those cases involved cross-racial identifications, but one of her books, Eyewitness Testimony, reports one such instance. See E. LoFrus,
supra note 77, at 204-15. The book includes a transcript of her testimony. Id at 217-35.
180 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973).
181
182

Id

at 1338.

See Clifford, supra note 139, at 167-68; Fishman & Loftus, supra note 140, at 95-101;

Comment, supra note 139, at 476-83.
183 United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1973); see supra notes 144-46
and accompanying text.
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a. Qualfed Expert. The requirement of a qualified expert is the
least troublesome and ordinarily should pose no problem. The Federal
Rules of Evidence provide that a witness may be qualified as an expert
1 84
based upon his "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education."
Admittedly, not all psychologists have the proper background to speak
authoritatively on factors affecting eyewitness testimony; psychology includes numerous subfields, and many psychologists have no training or
experience outside their specialty. Specialists in perception, memory,
experimental cognitive, or social psychology would be appropriate candidates, however, because the research on eyewitness testimony incorporates elements from all of these areas. 185 In addition to holding an
advanced degree in one of these areas, a witness proffered as an expert
would have to be familiar with all of the research on the own-race effect;
familiarity with only one study or with textbook summaries would not
sufficiently guarantee a balanced and informed perspective. Many psychologists who have sufficient expertise to qualify as experts would not
have experimented on the own-race effect themselves. Although counsel
might prefer a witness who can cite his own work, such a witness is not
18 6
necessarily more competent.
Under this standard a large number of psychologists are potentially
eligible for qualification. Thus under the first of the criteria outlined by
Amaral-the requirement of a qualified expert-testimony on the ownrace effect is indistinguishable from expert testimony on other aspects of
identification; there may be problems with some individuals proffered as
experts, but the standard is readily met.
184

185

FED. R. EvID. 702.

In order to make an accurate identification, the eyewitness must observe or
perceive the offender's face correctly, retain that complete perception without
distortion in memory and retrieve a faithful version of the remembered image
when called upon to identify a suspect at some later time. The term "eyewitness identification" refers to this entire process. Psychologists, however, in
studying the phenomenon, traditionally have examined each of the stages separately. Specialists in perception concentrate on the factors affecting a witness' awareness of objects, qualities or relations through the sense organs, and
have studied the manner in which sensory content is influenced by set and
prior experience. Memory specialists investigate the changes that occur between the time something is first learned or observed and the time it is recalled, including the factors involved in the very process of retrieving
information from memory. Social psychologists are interested in the manner
in which the witness' behavior throughout the process is influenced by other
individuals in a social environment.
Note, supra note 75, at 974 n. 11.
186 One student commentator has argued that a witness should have done work in the
field of eyewitness identification, but recognizes that the expert need not have researched
every fact about which he will testify. Note, supra note 75, at 1015 & n.212. Even this requirement seems unnecessary because all psychologists are trained to read the literature in
their subfield. A psychologist who has read all of the studies on a particular factor is as
competent as one working on the general area of eyewitness identification to summarize the
literature on that factor.

1984]

CROSS-RACIAL IDENTIFICATION

b. ProperSubject Matter. The second criterion for the admissibility
of expert psychological testimony is a proper subject matter. This requirement, variously phrased, appears in state court decisions as well as
federal, and is the most common justification for excluding any form of
psychological evidence. Courts may deem subject matter improper on
any one of three grounds: first, and most fundamental, that data on
parties not involved in the litigation are irrelevant; second, that the subject of the testimony is within the average juror's knowledge and experience; and third, that the expert's opinion invades the province of the
jury. Although each of these reasons has served as the rationale for excluding testimony on cross-racial identifications, careful consideration of
the own-race effect data reveals that reliance on any of the three is
erroneous.
(i) The Experimental Data is Irrelevant. Experimental data is useless
unless it is reliable and externally valid. Some of the experimental findings on other aspects of misidentification may be challenged for this reason. For example, it is unclear whether thefrequenc of misidentification
in experimental settings has external validity; testimony regarding rates
of laboratory misidentification, therefore, would be irrelevant to the
jury's task. As discussed in part I, this is not an obstacle to the introduction of testimony on the own-race effect, for the data are consistent (at
least as to other-race recognition impairment in whites)' 8 7 and there is
every reason to believe these studies reflect a real world phenomenon. 88
A second aspect of the irrelevancy objection is that the witness was
not a subject in the experiments relied on by the expert witness. Because not all of the subjects in the experiments display the own-race
effect, it is impossible to know whether a particular witness has an impaired ability to make cross-racial identifications. This means, the objection continues, that the data have nothing to do with the witness
whose testimony the jury must assess. Loftus and Monahan persuasively
rebut this objection:
The expert must agree that one cannot be sure whether any particular
witness is influenced by this factor or not. The expert can only argue
that a certain percentage of the people are affected in a particular
way. The jury is then free, as it should be, to use whatever other
information it has available to make the final decision about whether
the particular witness or defendent is to be classified with the majority
or the minority on this particular characteristic. Put another way,
probabilisticevidence can be presentedas such, with its application to a particularperson left for theju,7 to decide. 189
That evidence is probabilistic presents no inherent bar to admissi187
188
189

See supra notes 18-37 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 38-51 and accompanying text.
Loftus & Monahan, supra note 139, at 280 (emphasis in original).
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bility. As Wigmore explained, all circumstantial evidence is inductive

in form, and hence, probabilistic. 190 Expert probabilistic testimony
about physical (rather than psychological) events is commonplace. For
A brief examination will show that in the offering of evidence in court the
form of argument is always inductive. Suppose, to prove a charge of murder,
evidence is offered of the defendant's fixed design to kill the deceased. The
form of the argument is: "A planned to kill B, therefore, A probably did kill
B. " It is clear that we have here no semblance of a syllogism. The form of
argument is exactly the same when we argue, "Yesterday, December 31, A
slipped on the sidewalk and fell; therefore, the sidewalk was probably coated
with ice" or "Today A, who was bitten by a dog yesterday, died in convulsions; therefore, the dog probably had hydrophobia." So with all other legal
evidentiary facts. We may argue: "Last week the witness A had a quarrel
with the defendant B; therefore, A is probably biased against B'" "A was
found with a bloody knife in B's house; therefore, A is probably the murderer
of B'; "After B's injury at A's machinery, A repaired the machinery; therefore, A probably acknowledged that the machinery was negligently defective"; or "A, an adult of sound mind and senses, and apparently impartial,
was present at an affray between B and C and testifies that B struck first;
therefore, it is probably true that B did strike first." In all these cases, we take
a single or isolated fact and upon it base immediately an inference as to the
proposition in question.
It may be replied, however, that in all the above instances the argument
is implicitly based upon an understood law or generalization and is thus capable of being expressed in the deductive or syllogistic form. Thus, in the first
instance above, is not the true form, "Men's fixed designs are probably carried
out; A had a fixed design to kill B; therefore, A probably carried out his design and did kill B"? There are two answers to this. (1) It has just been seen
that every inductive argument is at least capable of being transmuted into
and stated in the deductive form by forcing into prominence the implied law
or generalization on which the argument rests more or less obscurely. Thus it
is nothing peculiar to litigious argument that this possibility of turning the
argument into deductive form exists here also. It is not a question of what the
form might be-for all inductive forms may be turned into deductive formsbut of what it is, as actually employed; and it is actually put forward in inductive form. (2) Even supposing this transmutation to be a possibility, it
would still be undesirable to make the transmutation for the purpose of testing probative values because it would be useless. We should ultimately come
to the same situation as before. Above, we have this: "A repaired machinery
after the accident; therefore, A was conscious of a negligent defect in it." Suppose we turn this into dedutive form: "People who make such repairs show a
consciousness of negligence; A made such repairs; therefore, A was conscious
of negligence." We now have an argument perfectly sound deductively, if the
premises be conceded. But it remains for the court to declare whether it accepts the major premise, and so the court must now take it up for examination. The proponent of the evidence appears as the champion of the premise,
and his argument becomes, "The fact that people make such repairs indicates
(shows, proves, probably shows, etc.) that they are conscious of negligence."
But here we come again, after all, to an inductive form of argument. The
consciouness of negligence is to be inferred from the fact of repairs, just as the
presence of electricity in the clouds was inferred by Franklin from the shock
through the kite string, i.e., by a purely inductive form of reasoning. So with
all other evidence when resolved into the dedcutive form; the transmutation is
useless because the court's attention is merely transferred from the syllogism
as a whole to the validity of the inference contained in the major premise,
which presents itself again in inductive form.
1A J. WIcMORE, supra note 138, § 30 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). But see
James, Relevancy, Probability and the Law, 29 CALIF. L. REV. 689, 694-701 (1941).
190
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example, courts do not reject breathalyzer evidence merely because the
expert must admit that the conversion formula for breath alcohol to
blood alcohol overestimates blood alcohol for some members of the
population. 191
(ii) The Experimental Data is Within the Average Juror's Experience.
Psychological findings that are not beyond the average juror's experience or knowledge are an improper subject for expert testimony. For
example, when the data lead to a common sense result, such as the finding that stress adversely affects memory, it may be that the expert testimony contributes little or nothing to the jury's understanding. The
own-race effect data, however, are clearly beyond the jury's ken.
It is true, as one court pointed OUt, 19 2 that the average layman has
some perception that members of another race are more difficult to recognize than those of one's own race. 193 But the standard does not require that the jury lack any experience or knowledge of its own, for this
would obviate almost all expert testimony. Rather, the requirement is
only that the proffered testimony contributes to a more intelligent evaluation of the facts. 194 Few jurors will have any notion of the true nature
of the own-race effect and the survey data show that a substantial
number of laymen are totally unaware of its existence. 195 There is another compelling reason to provide expert textimony on the own-race
effect: without the sanction of expert testimony, jurors are unlikely to
initiate discussion of this aspect of the identification. Many jurors will
be inhibited by the fear that acknowledging difficulty in identifying
members of other races shows them to be bigots, while other jurors will
be constrained by the belief that consideration of racial differences is
improper-as in most contexts, it is.
Furthermore, even in cases where jurors are aware of the existence
of the own-race effect and manage to surmount these obstacles to discussion, lack of information on the causes and correlates of the own-race
effect may lead the jury astray. A recent habeas corpus case illustrates
the danger. In Tobias v. Smith, 196 one white juror argued to the others
that he could not tell any blacks apart and that this was a reason for
191 In 1976 the National Safety Council Committee on Alcohol and Drugs approved the
blood/breath ratio of 2100 to 1 for use in legal proceedings even though it overestimates the
correct blood alcohol content for 14% of the population. The Committee reasoned that this
was an acceptable error rate if the breathalyzer test was only one of many pieces of evidence
on intoxication. R. ERWIN, DEFENSE OF DRUNK DRIVING CASES § 18-14.2 (3d ed. 1984).
192
People v. Dixon, 87 Ill. App. 3d 814, 410 N.E.2d 252 (1980).
193 Id at 818, 410 N.E.2d at 256.
194
"If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trieroffact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert . . . may
testitfy thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." (emphasis added). FED. R. EVID. 702.
195 See supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
196
468 F. Supp. 1287 (W.D.N.Y. 1979) (reversing conviction on ground of juror
misconduct).
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conviction. Apparently he believed that blacks were physically less distinguishable and that, as a practical matter, this required conviction
19 7
even when the identification of a black defendant was not positive.
An expert could have refuted the common perception that "they all look
alike" and could have explained that the correct statement of the phenomenon described by the juror is "they all look alike to me. " In addition to disposing of the erroneous biological explanation for the ownrace effect, the expert can also refute the two "common-sense" explanations: prejudice and lack of experience. Psychologists' initial theories of
the own-race effect plus the results of two surveys of laymen suggest that
most jurors without access to the data will believe that a witness with
positive attitudes towards the defendant's racial group is immune to
other-race impairment. 98 Furthermore, without expert testimony,
many jurors might accept a prosecutor's fallacious argument that a witness's accuracy in cross-racial identifications increases with exposure to
members of the defendant's race. 199 Thus, for several reasons, expert
testimony on the own-race effect is not vulnerable to the charge that it
20 0
contributes nothing that the jury does not already know.
(iii) The Experimental Data Invades the Province of the jug. Several
courts have held that evidence on the own-race effect is an improper
subject matter because it relates to another witness's credibility. 20 '
These courts reason that because credibility determinations are assigned
to the trier of fact, any expression of opinion on the credibility of another witness constitutes a comment on an "ultimate issue." As such, it
invades the province of the jury and is inadmissible.20 2 Consistent with
Wigmore's description of the "ultimate issue" rule as "one of those impracticable and misconceived utterances which lack any justification in
principle, '20 3 the rule has been abolished in a majority of jurisdictions
either by statute20 4 or by case law. 20 5 But even in those jurisdictions still
197

Id

198

See supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.

199

Id

at 1289.

200 Obviously, if data on the own-race effect were widely disseminated, expert testimony
would no longer be appropriate. Wide dissemination seems unlikely, although perhaps not as
unlikely as in highly .technical areas of expertise such as ballistics.
201 See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 501 F.2d 146, 150 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1974),rev'don other
grounds sub nom. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975); People v. Johnson, 38 Cal. App.
3d 1, 6-7, 112 Cal. Rptr. 834, 836-37 (1974); People v. Valentine, 53 A.D.2d 832, 832-33, 385
N.Y.S.2d 545, 546 (1976).
202 See Note, Expert Testimony as an "Invasion of the Province of the Juv," 26 IOWA L. REV.
819, 825 (1941).
203 7 J. WIGMORE, supra note 138, § 1921 (footnote omitted).
204 See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 704: "Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by
the trier of fact." Accord CAL. EVID. CODE § 805 (West 1966).
205 For a comprehensive compilation of the leading cases, see Grismore v. Consolidated
Prods. Co., 232 Iowa 328, 359-61, 5 N.W.2d 646, 662-63 (1942).
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adhering to the ultimate issue rule, expert testimony on the own-race
effect is not properly precluded. The psychologist testifying on the ownrace effect would express no opinion on the ultimate issue of the particular witness's credibility. Rather, he would merely report the relevant
psychological findings, thus informing the jury of the increased risk of
misidentification inherent in cross-racial identification. He would leave
to the jury the final determination of whether the cross-racial identification at issue was accurate.
c. Conformity to a Generally Accepted Theoy. The third requirement,
that the evidence conform to a generally accepted theory, stems from
Fye v. United States.206 The Fye court rejected an offer of expert testimony on the reliability of a systolic blood pressure lie detector test, because the procedure had not yet gained adequate "standing and
scientific recognition among physiological and psychological authorities."' 20 7 Some commentators have argued that this requirement should
not be applied to all expert testimony, but limited to questions of the
admissibility of innovative scientific techniques and apparatus that
might unduly impress the jury.20 In support of this argument, they
point to the fact that courts have consistently applied the requirement
to polygraphs, breathalyzers, voice prints, radar, sodium pentothal
("truth serum"), and blood tests,20 9 but never to the testimony of medical and psychiatric experts.2 10 Because expert testimony on eyewitness
identification does not resemble testimony on the device at issue in Fye
in that there is no potential for persuading jurors of its infallibility, the
Amaral court was probably wrong to require satisfaction of the Fgye standard as a condition for admissibility.
Even if the Fye requirement of an underlying generally accepted
explanatory theory is retained, it should not operate as a bar to the admissibility of expert testimony on the own-race effect. Human perception and memory have been the subject of voluminous research for over
seventy-five years, and the general causal principles are well understood.2 1' It is true that the precise explanation for the own-race effect is
still evolving, 21 2 but the existence of the phenomenon is universally
2 13
accepted.
d. Probative Value OutweighingPrejudicialEfect. The final criterion for
206
207

293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
Id at 1014.

208 See BoyceJudicial Recognition of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases, 8 UTAH L. REv.
313, 325-27 (1963-64); Strong, Ojiestions Affecting the Admissibiity of Sientifc Evidence, 1970 U.
ILL. L.F. 1; Note, supra note 75, at 1021-22.
209 See Boyce, supra note 208, at 325-27; Strong, supra note 208, at 15-22.
210 See Boyce, supra note 208, at 325-27.
211 For references to major early works in the field of human perception and memory see
Note, supra note 75, at 974 n.12.
212 See supra notes 52-73 and accompanying text.
213 See supra notes 18-38 and accompanying text.
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the admissibility of expert psychological testimony requires that the probative value of the proffered testimony outweigh its prejudicial effect.
Obviously, this consideration necessitates a case-specific analysis. Nevertheless, isolating the own-race effect makes generalization possible.
(i) Probative Value. Those critical of admitting expert psychological
testimony have argued that there is no way to determine whether jurors
place too much or too little reliance on eyewitness identification. If they
place too little, so the argument goes, expert testimony will only magnify
existing errors. 2 14 Although this could be true of some kinds of testimony on the unreliability of identifications, it has no application to testimony on the own-race effect because the expert will not address the
absolute reliability of identifications, cross-racial or otherwise.
The evidence that the expert can contribute in this area is extremely probative. The own-race effect data, particularly on whiteblack identifications, show consistent impairment of recognition abilities. 2 15 Equally important is the magnitude of the own-race effect. If the
cross-racial recognition rate were only five percent less than the rate for
own-race identifications, the probative value might be slight, but the
recognition rates frequently vary by one-third. 2 16 Furthermore, the
knowledge that cross-racial identification rates are substantially less reliable regardless of the attitudes, experience, or confidence of the witness
is a significant factor in the intelligent assessment of the reliability of an
identification. As discussed previously, jurors do not have this information, and the techniques of cross-examination and closing argument cannot convey it effectively. Because a mistaken identification is likely to
deprive the defendant of his liberty, or even his life, the possibility that
evidence on the own-race effect might alter the jury's evaluation of the
identification compels its admission, at least in the absence of a serious
21 7
threat of prejudice.
(ii) Pr'udicialEffect. The primary purpose of the prejudice rule is
to avoid arousing the jury's prejudice, hostility, or sympathy.2 1 8 In the
context of expert testimony, the concern is that the expert's credentials
may induce the jury to place undue reliance on his expertise, and thus
preclude the jury's independent judgment of the facts. This concern is
inapposite with regard to testimony on the own-race effect because the
expert will express no conclusion on which the jury could rely. If the fear
214 Wells, Applied Eyewitness Testimony Research, 12 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH.
1546, 1551 (1978).
215 See supra notes 18-38 and accompanying text.
216 See Goldstein & Chance, supra note 48, at 47.
217
Cf Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (strict adherence to state evidentiary
rules violates due process where evidence is trustworthy and of central importance to defendant's case); see also Churchwell, The ConstitutionalRight to Present Evidence: Progeny of Chambers
v. Mississippi, 19 CRIM. L. BULL. 131 (1983) (discussing subsequent applications of Chambers).
218
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 120, § 185.
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is that the expert will overstate the evidence-for example, make a blanket statement that a black witness undoubtedly will suffer from crossracial recognition impairment-the appropriate remedy is cross-examination eliciting the relevant studies, or, in an extreme situation, a rebuttal witness.
Ancillary purposes of the prejudice rule include preventing the tangential exploration of issues that may distract the jury from central
questions, may consume an undue amount of time, or may create unfair
surprise to the opposing party.2 1 9 Generally, testimony on the own-race
effect should not frustrate any of these purposes. First, the issue of identification accuracy is rarely tangential. 220 Second, the requisite testimony and cross-examination would be quite brief. Although the
prosecutor occasionally might want to call a rebuttal expert, the defense
psychologist's limited role in describing the experimental findings makes
the advantage of doing so dubious. Certainly the "battle of the experts"
that the insanity defense often provokes is unlikely in cross-racial identification cases. Third, the salience of a cross-racial identification in a
criminal case puts the prosecutor on notice of possible testimony on the
own-race effect, thus eliminating the danger of surprise and unfair
advantage.
None of the traditional criteria for admitting expert testimony present legitimate hurdles to the admission of testimony on the own-race
effect. Discretion on the part of the trial judge is unnecessary, because
application of the standards to this data does not depend on the factual
circumstances of each case. Fears that requiring admission of own-race
effect testimony as a matter of right will lead to admission of expert
psychological testimony on all aspects of eyewitness identification and,
eventually, on all aspects of any eyewitness testimony, should not inhibit
this development. The slippery slope argument merits but a brief response: even if there are no bright lines, distinctions of degree are always possible. The case for mandatory admission of proffered testimony
on the own-race effect is compelling. Less compelling cases may be decided differently.
4.

Other Problems

Allowing expert testimony on the own-race effect would do much
to counter the effects of erroneous cross-racial identification. The attractiveness of this remedy lies in its potential for conveying information
precisely, and in the modest change it requires. The remedy is, however,
flawed by some practical considerations.
Id § 187.
220 In those cases where the circumstantial evidence of identity is /rulovervhelming, one
would not expect either defense counsel or the prosecutor to spend much time testing the
reliability of eyewitness testimony.
219
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Financial considerations present the biggest problem. Because expert witnesses demand remuneration and most defendants are indigent,
it becomes necessary to consider whether the state must fund these experts. Although there has been an increased recognition of the indigent's right to state-reimbursed experts, 221 determination of the need for
such an expert is generally within the trial court's discretion.2 2 2 The
right to present evidence is probably broader than the right to state subsidization of that presentation. 223 Even in cases where the trial court
authorizes funding for an expert, the statutory ceiling on such expenditures frequently will preclude an indigent from actually retaining the
2 24
expert.
Furthermore, the need for experts on the own-race effect in many
jurisdictions would be frequent 225 and would therefore impose a greater
financial burden on the state than results from most kinds of expert testimony. One suspects that this in turn would result in fewer discretionary authorizations by trial courts. From the defense perspective, a
stipulation with the prosecutor as to the content of an expert's testimony
would resolve these practical problems. The incentive for prosecutors to
agree to such stipulations probably would be small, however, at least in
cases involving indigent defendants.
C.

Jury Instructions

The practical obstacles facing the use of expert testimony on the
own-race effect suggest that another safeguard-the adoption of cautionary jury instructions-should be considered. Some commentators
have viewed the trend toward adoption of such jury instructions as a
most promising development.2 2 6 Although most jurisdictions have not
incorporated the available psychological data into cautionary instructions, these commentators stress that it is possible to do so. 2 2 7 We can
221

1 A. AMSTERDAM, TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES §§ 298-

301 (3d ed. 1977).
222 See Note, The Indigent's Right to an Adequate Defense: Expert andInvestigationalAsszstance in
CriminalProceedings, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 632, 635 (1970).
223 This is perhaps unavoidable. It may be that a lenient rule permitting the defendant
to present four psychiatrists' testimony that he is insane is desirable. It does not necessarily
follow that the state must subsidize four psychiatrists for every indigent defendant's insanity
defense.
224 See, e.g., N.Y. COUNTY LAW § 722-c (McKinney Supp. 1983) (authorizes hiring of
expert witness for indigent defendant but payment is not to exceed $300 except in extraordinary circumstances).
225 See Bazelon, supra note 11, at 105.
226 See, e.g., Grano, Kirby, Biggers, and Ash- Do Any ConstitutionalSafeguardsRemain Against
the Dangerof Convictingthe Innocent?, 72 MICH. L. REV. 717, 795-97 (1974); Note, supra note 75,
at 1004; Note, Eyewitness Identification Testimony and the Needfor CautionayJug Instructions in
Crininal Cases, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 1387, 1434-35 (1983).
227 See Note, supra note 226, at 1428 n.220; see also E. Lorus, supra note 77, at 189
(advocating cautionary jury instructions as first step); Grano, supra note 226, at 796 (same).
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consider the propriety of including data on the own-race effect in jury
instructions without making any broad generalizations concerning how
effective or appropriate jury instructions are in responding to other
sources of misidentification.
1. The Content and Tning ofInstructions on the Own-Race Efect
Most cautionary jury instructions first exhort the jurors that the
prosecutor's burden of proving his case beyond a reasonable doubt includes the identity of the defendant as perpetrator. The court then advises the jurors to consider factors such as the witness's capacity and
opportunity for observation, suggestive circumstances that may have influenced the identification, and prior misidentifications or failures to
make an identification, as well as the truthfulness of the witness.2 28
228 The model instructions set forth in United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir.
1972), are typical:
One of the most important issues in this case is the identification of the
defendant as the perpetrator of the crime. The Government has the burden
of providing [sic] identity, beyond a reasonable doubt. It is not essential that
the witness himself be free from doubt as to the correctness of his statement.
However, you, the jury, must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the
accuracy of the identification of the defendant before you may convict him.
If you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was
the person who committed the crime, you must find the defendant not guilty.
Identification testimony is an expression of belief or impression by the
witness. Its value depends on the opportunity the witness had to observe the
offender at the time of the offense and to make a reliable identificaiton later.
In appraising the identification testimony of a witness, you should consider the following:
(1) Are you convinced that the witness had the capacity and an adequate opportunity to observe the offender?
Whether the witness had an adequate opportunity to observe the offender at the time of the offense will be affected by such matters as how long
or short a time was available, how far or close the witness was, how good were
lighting conditions, whether the witness had had occasion to see or know the
person in the past.
[In general, a witness bases any identification he makes on his perception
through the use of his senses. Usually the witness identifies an offender by the
sense of sight-but this is not necessarily so, and he may use other senses.]
(2) Are you satisified that the identification made by the witness subsequent to the offense was the product of his own recollection? You may take
into account both the strength of the identification, and the circumstances
under which the identification was made.
If the identification by the witness may have been influenced by the circumstances under which the defendant was presented to him for identification, you should scrutinize the identification with great care. You may also
consider the length of time that lapsed between the occurrence of the crime
and the next opportunity of the witness to see defendant, as a factor bearing
on the reliability of the identification.
[You may also take into account that an identification made by picking
the defendant out of a group of similar individuals is generally more reliable
than one which results from the presentation of the defendant alone to the
witness.]
[(3) You may take into account any occasions in which the witness failed
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Judge Bazelon has proposed a supplementary instruction when the
case involves cross-racial identification:
In this case the identifying witness is of a different race than the defendant. In the experience of many it is more difficult to identify
members of a different race than members of one's own. If this is also
your experience, you may consider it in evaluating the witness's testimony. You must also consider, of course, whether there are other factors present in this case which overcome any such difficulty of
identification. For example, you may conclude that the witness has
had sufficient contacts with members of the defendant's race that he
would not have greater difficulty in making a reliable
229
identification.
This instruction is inadequate for two reasons. First, it conveys no
psychological data; it merely suggests that the jurors consider the difficulties inherent in cross-racial identifications if hey have experienced such
difculties themselves. Second, the instruction conveys inaccurate information by suggesting that the own-race effect may not operate where the
witness has had interracial experiences.
A more successful instruction requires only a modest revision:
In this case the identifying witness is of a different race than the defendant. In the experience of many it is more difficult to identify
members of a different race than members of one's own. Psychological studies support this impression. In addition, laboratory studies reveal that even people with no prejudice against other races and
substantial contact with persons of other races still experience difficulty in accurately identifying members of a different race. Quite
often people do not recognize this difficulty in themselves. You
should consider these facts in evaluating the witness's testimony, but
you must also consider whether there are other factors present in this
case that overcome any such difficulty of identification.
Although this instruction does the trick, it is a more radical departure
from usual instructions. It may be criticized for focusing on one source
of identification error. This criticism is particularly troublesome beto make an identification of defendant, or made an identification that was
inconsistent with his identification at trial.]
(4) Finally, you must consider the credibility of each identification witness in the same way as any other witness, consider whether he is truthful, and
consider whether he had the capacity and opportunity to make a reliable
observation on the matter covered in his testimony.
I again emphasize that the burden of proof on the prosecutor extends to
every element of the crime charged, and this specifically includes the burden
of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the identity of the defendant as the
perpetrator of the crime with which he stands charged. If after examining the
testimony, you have a reasonable doubt as to the accuracy of the identification, you must find the defendant not guilty.

Id at 558-59. The bracketed sentences are to be used only if appropriate. Id at 558.
229 Id at 561 (Bazelon, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
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cause the instruction has the judicial stamp of importance and neutrality. A further ground for criticism of the instruction is that its failure to
convey information on the strength of the own-race effect may frustrate
the jury.
A second issue pertains to the appropriate timing for the instruction. Judge Bazelon assumed the instruction would be part of the more
general cautionary comments on identification testimony, and suggested
that it immediately follow the admonition concerning the witness's opportunity and capacity to observe the defendant. 230 Some commentators have argued that, in order to be effective, instructions on
identification should precede eyewitness testimony. 23 1 They may be
right, but absent substantial change in the statutes governing trial pro23 2
cedure courts probably will not adopt this sequence.
2.

The JudicialResponse

a. The General Trend Toward Cautionary Instructionson Eyewitness Identification. Several courts have recently considered the formulation of cautionary jury instructions on eyewitness identification. Unlike arguments
in favor of the admissibility of expert testimony, the plea for additional
instructions has frequently reached sympathetic ears.
The leading case on cautionary instructions is United States v.
Telfaire,2 33 decided by the District of Columbia Circuit in 1972.
Telfaire argued on appeal that the trial court committed reversible error
when it failed to give a special instruction on identification. Although
the court affirmed Telfaire's conviction, 234 it took the occasion to promulgate "Model Special Instructions on Identification." 235 These instructions direct the jury's attention to the reliability factors articulated
by the Supreme Court in the suppression hearing cases of United States v.
Wade236 and Stovall v. Denno.2 37 They make no reference to the findings
of psychologists.
The federal courts have given Telfaire a warm reception; all circuits
have approved cautionary instructions except the Fifth and Eleventh,
230

Id

at n.10.

231 Leippe, Effcts of IntegrativeMemorial and Cognitive Processeson the Correspondenceof Eyewitness Accuraq and Confidence, 4 LAW & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 261, 272-73 (1980); Note, supra note
226, at 1431-32.
232 For arguments that jury instructions generally should precede the taking of testimony, see Schwarzer, Communicating With Juries: Problems and Remedies, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 731
(1981); NoteJut , Instructions v. Jury Charges, 82 W. VA. L. REV. 555, 562-64 (1980).
233 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
234 The court reasoned that the omission was harmless error due to the inherent reliability of the identification at issue and because the jury's attention had otherwise been focused
on the issue of identity. Id at 556-57.
235 Id at 558-59. See supra note 228 for the text of these instructions.
236 388 U.S. 218, 228-39 (1967).
237 388 U.S. 293, 296-97 (1967).
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which have not yet had occasion to rule on the issue. 238 The courts of
appeals are split, however, on the issue of whether the failure to give
239
such instructions is reversible error.
The state courts have been less receptive. Although courts in West
Virginia, 240 Massachusetts, 24' Kansas,2 42 and New York 243 have held
that a trial court errs when it refuses to give Telfaire-style instructions,
the vast majority of states either prohibit or fail to require them. Several of the state courts that prohibit such instructions hold that the requested instruction violates the prohibition against judicial comment on
the evidence, 244 while others condemn the instructions as complex,
238 See, e.g., United States v. Thoma, 713 F.2d 604, 607-08 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 721 (1984); United States v. Cain, 616 F.2d 1056, 1058 (8th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Scott, 578 F.2d 1186, 1191 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 870 (1978); United States
v. Kavanagh, 572 F.2d 9, 12 (Ist Cir. 1978); United States v. Lewis, 565 F.2d 1248, 1253 (2d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 973 (1978); United States v. Collins, 559 F.2d 561, 566 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 907 (1977); United States v. Roundtree, 527 F.2d 16, 19 (8th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 923 (1976); United States v. Hodges, 515 F.2d 650, 652-53 (7th
Cir. 1975); United States v. Holley, 502 F.2d 273, 275 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v.
O'Neal, 496 F.2d 368, 373 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. Fernandez, 456 F.2d 638, 643-44
(2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Barber, 442 F.2d 517, 528 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 958
(1971).
239 The Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have reversed convictions for failure to give
cautionary instructions. United States v. Holley, 502 F.2d 273, 276-77 (4th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Hodges, 515 F.2d 650, 653 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Greene, 591 F.2d 471,
475-77 (8th Cir. 1979). The other circuits generally hold that the decision whether to give a
cautionary instruction is within the trial judge's discretion, assuming that he raised the issue
of identification for the jury's consideration. See, e.g., United States v. Cueto, 628 F.2d 1273,
1276 (10th Cir. 1980); United States v. Field, 625 F.2d 862, 872 (9th Cir. 1980); United States
v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Evans, 484 F.2d 1178, 1188
(2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Barber, 442 F.2d 517, 527-28 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
958 (1971).
240 See State v. Payne, 280 S.E.2d 72, 78-79 (W. Va. 1981).
241 See Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472,483-84,399 N.E.2d 482,489-90 (1980);
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 378 Mass. 296, 302, 391 N.E.2d 889, 893 (1979).
242 See State v. Warren, 230 Kan. 385, 396-97, 635 P.2d 1236, 1243-44 (1981).
243 The New York appellate courts have repeatedly reversed convictions where the trial

court failed to instruct the jury properly on how to evaluate eyewitness identification testimony. See, e.g., People v. Hall, 82 A.D.2d 838, 839, 439 N.Y.S.2d 661, 663 (1981); People v.
Gaines, 80 A.D.2d 561, 562, 435 N.Y.S.2d 346, 347 (1981); People v. Merriman, 79 A.D.2d
619, 619, 433 N.Y.S.2d 475, 476 (1980); People v. Bruno, 77 A.D.2d 922, 923, 431 N.Y.S.2d
106, 107 (1980); People v. Rothaar, 75 A.D.2d 652, 652, 427 N.Y.S.2d 272, 273 (1980).
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire recently stated that in the future it would "view
with grave concern" the failure to give a cautionary instruction in cases in which "eyewitness
identification is essential to support a conviction." State v. Burke, 122 N.H. 565, 571, 448
A.2d 962, 966 (1982).
244 See, e.g., State v. Valencia, 118 Ariz. 136, 138, 575 P.2d 335, 337 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977);
Conley v. State, 270 Ark. 886, 889, 607 S.W.2d 328, 330 (1980); State v. Robinson, 274 S.C.
198, 203, 262 S.E.2d 729, 731-32 (1980); State v. Jordan, 17 Wash. App. 542, 545, 564 P.2d
340, 341 (1977).
Thirty-nine states prohibit judicial comment on the evidence. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL,
THE AMERICAN JURY 420, Table 104 (1966). The federal courts and the following 11 states
permit judicial comments: California, Connecticut, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, and Wisconsin. Id
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lengthy, and biased. 245 Some courts simply hold that the decision to
give such instructions is discretionary, 246 reasoning that because crossexamination and closing arguments frequently focus the jury's attention
on identification, general instructions on the prosecutor's burden of
proof and the credibility of witnesses are sufficient. 24 7 A few courts have
held that the instructions achieve the necessary focus on the difficulties
of eyewitness identification only if they include a statement that the
248
prosecution must prove identity beyond a reasonable doubt.
b. The Response to Requestsfor Instructions on Cross-RacialIdenti cation.

Judge Bazelon's concurrence in Tefaire marked the first judicial consideration of a jury instruction on the own-race effect. In an earlier concurrence, Bazelon discussed the own-race effect data and the need for
providing the jury with information on cross-racial identification, but
did not specify the means for doing so. 249 In Telfaire, he concluded that
jury instructions provided the best means to supply such information,
245 See, e.g., People v. Robinson, 75 Ill. App. 3d 112, 115-16, 394 N.E.2d 13, 15-16 (1979);
People v. Burnett, 74 Ill. App. 3d 990, 1001-02, 394 N.E.2d 456, 464-65 (1979); State v. Higgins, 592 S.W.2d 151, 161 (Mo. 1979) (en banc), apealdismissed, 446 U.S. 902 (1980); State v.
White, 617 S.W.2d 596, 597 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); State v. Sloan, 575 S.W.2d 836, 837 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1978).
246 See, e.g., Vincent v. State, 399 So. 2d 923, 927 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981); People v.
Hurley, 95 Cal. App. 3d 895, 900-01, 157 Cal. Rptr. 364, 366-67 (1979); People v. Reynolds,
38 Colo. App. 258, 260, 559 P.2d 714, 716 (1976); State v. Harden, 175 Conn. 315, 319-23,
398 A.2d 1169, 1171-73 (1978); Wilkerson v. United States, 427 A.2d 923, 927-28 (D.C.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 852 (1981); Nelson v. State, 362 So. 2d 1017, 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978);
Sapp v. State, 155 Ga. App. 485, 486, 271 S.E.2d 19, 21 (1980); State v. Padilla, 57 Hawaii
150, 161-62, 552 P.2d 357, 365 (1976); Brock v. Commonwealth, 627 S.W.2d 42, 43 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1009 (1982); Sparks v. State, 96 Nev. 26, 29, 604 P.2d 802,
804 (1980); State v. Burke, 122 N.H. 565, 570-71, 448 A.2d 962, 965 (1982); State v. Mazurek,
88 N.M. 56, 58, 537 P.2d 51, 53 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975); State v. Guster, 66 Ohio St. 2d 266,
272-73, 421 N.E.2d 157, 161 (1981); State v. Christian, 35 Or. App. 339, 344, 581 P.2d 132,
134 (1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 845 (1979); State v. Jones, 273 S.C. 723, 735, 259 S.E.2d 120,
126 (1979); State v. Lewis, 628 S.W.2d 750, 752 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981); State v. Kasper,
137 Vt. 184, 211, 404 A.2d 85, 100 (1979); Hampton v. State, 92 Wis. 2d 450, 461-63, 285
N.W.2d 868, 874-75 (1979).
247
See, e.g., Conley v. State, 270 Ark. 886, 890, 607 S.W.2d 328, 330 (1980); People v.
Hurley, 95 Cal. App. 3d 895, 900-01, 157 Cal. Rptr. 364, 366-67 (1979); People v. Reynolds,
38 Colo. App. 258, 260, 559 P.2d 714, 715-16 (1976); Nelson v. State, 362 So. 2d 1017, 1022
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); State v. Padilla, 57 Hawaii 150, 162, 552 P.2d 357, 365 (1976);
State v. Thomas, 541 S.W.2d 775, 777 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Sparks v. State, 96 Nev. 26, 29,
604 P.2d 802, 804 (1980); State v. Ollison, 16 Or. App. 544, 556, 519 P.2d 393, 396 (1974);
State v. Jones, 273 S.C. 723, 735, 259 S.E.2d 120, 126 (1979); State v. Lewis, 628 S.W.2d 750,
752 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981); State v. Schaffer, 638 P.2d 1185, 1187 (Utah 1981); State v.
Kasper, 137 Vt. 185, 211, 404 A.2d 85, 100 (1979); State v. Edwards, 23 Wash. App. 893, 89697, 600 P.2d 566, 569 (1979).
248 See, e.g., People v. Smith, 67 Cal. App. 3d 45, 49, 136 Cal. Rptr. 387, 389 (1977);
People v. Guzman, 47 Cal. App. 3d 380, 387-88, 121 Cal. Rptr. 69, 73 (1975); State v. Green,
86 NJ. 281, 293, 430 A.2d 914, 920 (1981); State v. Guster, 66 Ohio St. 2d 266, 272, 421
N.E.2d 157, 161 (1981); Holt v. State, 591 S.W.2d 785, 791 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1979); Hampton v. State, 92 Wis. 2d 450, 462-63, 285 N.W.2d 868, 874-75 (1979).
249 United States v. Brown, 461 F.2d 134, 145 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, J.,
concurring).
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arguing that courts should not rely on closing argument because the
inadvertence or inexperience of counsel could preclude the jury from
250
consideration of a factor established by psychologists as important.
Bazelon anticipated resistance based on the fear that such instructions
would be "prejudicial" or "divisive," 251 but maintained that neither fear
is justified. In his view, the instructions are not prejudicial because they
do not encourage decisions on "improper" bases, such as fear or animosity; instead, they merely advise the jury to consider racial differences
that are logically relevant to the facts in dispute. 252 Furthermore,
Bazelon reasoned that it is not "divisive" to point out that racial differences exist and may unintentionally affect determinations of guilt. He
concluded that "if there can be any circumstances which would justify
the fiction that these divisions do not exist . . . , a criminal trial is not
any of them. '253 This is because truth is more important than reassurance. 254 Finally, Bazelon suggested that a jury instruction on cross-racial
identification may actually reduce existing prejudice by defining the
255
narrow context in which racial differences are relevant.
In a second Telfaire concurrence, Judge Leventhal responded to
Judge Bazelon's arguments. He described the issue of cross-racial identifications as "not ripe for this kind of distillation of wisdom, ' 256 basing
his assessment on the "meager" data available and the inconsistent findings on whether black subjects identifying white faces experience the
own-race effect. 25 7 He also disagreed with Bazelon on the perils of
divisiveness:
The wisdom of making haste slowly in discerning the generalization ready for inclusion in model instructions is underscored when
what is involved is as sensitive as race relations in our society. If the
subject of inter-racial identification is to be covered in instructions
that are informative and objective, we may be opening the door to
questioning and proffers of proof so that eyery time a witness makes
an identification of an offender of another race, he is subject to crossexamination on the nature and extent of his contacts with and attitudes (favorable or not) toward the other race. The more I ponder the
problems, the better I understand the kernel of wisdom in the decisions that shy away from instructions on inter-racial identifications as
divisive.

258

Te/faire, 469 F.2d at 560.
Here Bazelon cited the New York cases, see supra notes 124-25, forbidding argument
on the subject of racial differences. 469 F.2d at 559 n.4.
252
469 F.2d at 560.
250
251

253

Id

254

Id

255

Id at 560-61.

256

Id at 561 (Leventhal, J., concurring).
Id at 561-62.
Id at 562 (footnote omitted).

257
258
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Leventhal did not exclude the possibility that some action on the problem of cross-racial identification is needed, but he contended that a legislative committee, rather than an adversarial proceeding, would be the
25 9
appropriate forum for exploring the various options.
Of the five other jurisdictions that have considered the issue of
cross-racial identification instructions, four have refused to require
them. 260 Both the District of Columbia Court of Appeals 261 and the
North Carolina Supreme Court 262 cited Judge Leventhal's concurring
opinion in holding that such instructions were not mandated. The
Tenth Circuit suggested that such instructions are "more in the realm of
argument than law."'263 Finally, an Illinois appellate court relied on
general opposition to cautionary instructions of any sort, viewing the
Bazelon instruction as violating the legislature's mandate that all crimi2 64
nal instructions be "simple, brief, impartial and free from argument.
The only decision requiring a cross-racial identification instruction
is People v. West, 265 a 1983 decision of the California Court of Appeals
that is idiosyncratic in its reasoning. The defendant had requested an
instruction listing eight factors for the jury to consider in determining if
the prosecution had proved identity beyond a reasonable doubt. 266 One
factor was "any evidence relating to the cross-racial nature of the identi259 Id at 563.
260 See United States v. Ingram, 600 F.2d 260, 263 (10th Cir. 1979); Abney v. United
States, 347 A.2d 402, 402-03 (D.C. 1975); People v. White, 58 Ill. App. 3d 226, 226-28, 374
N.E.2d 250, 251 (1978); State v. Allen, 301 N.C. 489, 494-95, 272 S.E.2d 116, 120 (1980).
26t Abney v. United States, 347 A.2d 402, 403 (D.C. 1975).
262 State v. Allen, 304 N.C. 489, 495, 272 S.E.2d 116, 120 (1980). TheAllen court added
that "[i]n the case at hand, there is no indication that race in any way affected the identification of defendant by the witnesses." Id

263
264
265
266

United States v. Ingram, 600 F.2d 260, 263 (10th Cir. 1979).
People v. White, 58 Ill. App. 3d 226, 227-28, 374 N.E.2d 250, 251 (1978).
139 Cal. App. 3d 606, 189 Cal. Rptr. 36 (1983).
The proposed instruction read:
In determining whether reasonable doubt exists in regard to the identification
of the defendant, .
you should consider, among others, the following factors:
Any evidence relating to the witness' opportunity to observe the alleged
criminal act;
Any evidence relating to the witness' opportunity to observe the persons
committing that act;

Any evidence relating to the stress under which the witness made observations;
Any evidence relating to whether the witness was able to provide a
description of the perpetrator of the act;
Any evidence relating to any inconsistency between the descriptions of
the perpetrator and the defendant's description;
Any evidence relating to the cross-racial nature of the identification;
Any evidence relating to whether the witness had an uncorrected visual

deficiency;
Any evidence

relating

identifications.
d. at 609, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 38.

to the

witness'

ability to make other
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fication. '' 267 The trial court refused the proposed instruction and the
appellate court reversed. Under California law, the defendant is entitled to instructions that direct the jury's attention to evidence from
which the jury could infer a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's
guilt.2 68 Without discussing the issue of cross-racial identification, the
court reasoned that because the proposed instructions mentioned several
factors that might create a reasonable doubt, the refusal to give the in269
structions was error.
3.

MeetingJudicial Objections

a. The Needfor Instructions on the Own-Race Efect. The most basic
judicial objection to cross-racial identification instructions-that they
are unnecessary-has already been addressed in the context of expert
testimony. 270 This objection, like the Amaral requirement of a proper
subject matter, asks for proof that innovation will substantially improve
the jury's ability to evaluate the facts. The answer to this objection lies
not in generalities about identification error, but in the specifics of the
own-race effect. Additional protection is needed because the own-race
effect strongly influences the accuracy of identification, because that influence is not understood by the average juror, because cross-examination cannot reveal its effects, and because jurors are unlikely to discuss
racial factors freely without some authorization to do so.
b. The Ripeness of ProposedInstructions on the Own-Race Eect. A second objection to instructions on cross-racial identification points to conflicting data in arguing that the subject is not yet ripe for formulation of
an instruction. Here the parallel between expert testimony and jury instructions is less exact. Conflicting data is more problematic in the context of jury instructions because cross-examination is unavailable to
probe overbroad generalizations. Nevertheless, the ripeness objection
has no bearing on a large subset of cross-racial identifications: those in
which the victim is white and the defendant is black. In those cases,
experimenters have consistently observed the own-race phenomenon.2 71
The ripeness objection is more apposite where other cross-racial
identifications are at issue. Only half of the studies on black subjects
have found the own-race effect. 272 The data on Asian subjects is scanty,
but the few studies that exist do report an own-race effect. 273 There is no
data on subjects from other minority groups. Unfortunately, the passage
of time may produce neither more consistent results nor studies of addi267

Id

268

Id

269
270
271
272
273

Id. at 610, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 38-39.
See supra notes 187-200 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 18-32 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
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tional minority groups. The inconsistent results with black subjects suggests that greater variability exists in black subject cross-racial
recognition abilities than in white subjects; the dearth of studies on Hispanics and Native Americans may reflect a lesser availability of subjects.
Because these conditions are slow to change, "better" instructions may
not be forthcoming at any time in the near future. The question then
becomes whether longer and more complex instructions on these crossracial identifications are better than no instructions at all.
c. Statutog Constraints on the Content ofJury Instructions. Although
judges in the federal trial courts are relatively free to comment on the
evidence and express opinions on the facts, they have no constitutional
mandate to do so. The Supreme Court has imposed only modest jury
instruction requirements on the state courts: the judge must instruct the
2 74
jurors that the defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty,
and that the prosecution must prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 275 The judge also must avoid giving instructions that
infringe upon the defendant's constitutional rights.2 76 Therefore, if a
state judge rules that a statutory prohibition against comment on the
evidence or against lengthy instructions bars cross-racial identification
instructions, the defendant has no constitutional complaint.
It is open to question, however, whether courts should construe
these statutory prohibitions as precluding instructions on cross-racial
identifications. Although some proposed cautionary instructions do include an evaluation of the witness's credibility, the proposed instructions
on the own-race effect do not. These instructions admonish the jurors to
consider a factor they otherwise might have overlooked, but they do not
tell the jurors how to weigh that factor. As a result, such instructions do
not constitute judicial infringement on the jury's factfinding role. Nor
should courts necessarily reject requests for cross-racial identification instructions as violating statutory requirements of short and simple instructions; these instructions could be condensed into one sentence
2 77
admonitions if lack of brevity is the obstacle to their adoption.
d. Divisiveness. The divisiveness objection is specific to cross-racial
274 Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 487, 485 (1978). But see Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S.
786, 789 (1979) (per curiam) (failure to give instruction on presumption of innocence does not
violate Constitution if other instructions are adequate).
275 Cf In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of offense). The federal courts of appeals have held that the failure
to instruct the jury that the prosecution must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, if properly objected to, is reversible error. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 569 F.2d 1003, 1008
n.12 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 907 (1978); United States v. Corrigan, 548 F.2d 879, 883
(10th Cir. 1977).
276 See, e.g., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
277 For example, the instruction requested in People v. West, 139 Cal. App. 3d 606, 609,
189 Cal. Rptr. 36, 38 (1983), that the jurors consider "[a]ny evidence relating to the crossracial nature of the identification" is a model of brevity.
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identification instructions. The objection concedes the general need for
cautionary instructions, but argues that this need is outweighed by the
risk of arousing racial animosity. This objection has no counterpart in
the consideration of expert testimony on the own-race effect, because it
is thejudicial acknowledgement of racial differences that is troubling.
Perhaps these fears are genuine, but an ostrich-like response to such
fears is irresponsible.
Some might object here that the Constitution often commands ostrich-like behavior on questions of race, and that Judge Leventhal's concern over "divisiveness" can be more authoritatively dressed in equal
protection clothes. But an equal protection objection is without merit
for two reasons. First, although jury instructions constitute state action
adverting to race, they establish no disadvantaging classification. Strict
scrutiny is therefore inappropriate.2 78 Second, even if strict scrutiny
were the proper standard, this classification arguably satisfies that standard: the state's interest in preventing wrongful convictions is surely
2 79
compelling, and the instruction is perfectly tailored to that interest.
If we return to the divisiveness issue as Judge Leventhal cast it, two
distinct risks appear. First, there is the risk of engendering racial animosity prejudicial to the defendant's interest in a fair trial. This risk
seems small enough to disregard. That defendants (rather than prosecutors) are requesting this instruction suggests that the risk of prejudice to
the defendant is insignificant. The judgment of counsel might be wrong,
but reference to the language of the instruction supports that judgment:
the words are tempered and objective, reporting the phenomenon without implying blameworthiness. Any judicial instruction-including
those admonishing the jury not to consider the defendant's race in determining his guilt-might in some circumstances prompt a hostile and
biased evaluation of the evidence. From the defendant's perspective, the
risk that the jury will neglect the increased unreliability of cross-racial
identification clearly outweighs the risk of such an improbable response
to a cautionary instruction.
The courts' fear of divisiveness, however, may extend beyond the
278 Absent discriminatory effects, provisions for racial designations do not require strict
scrutiny. Tancil v. Woolls, 379 U.S. 19 (1964) (per curiam). The racial classification in crossracial identification instructions does little more than designate the race of the defendant and
witness, and inform the jury of relevant data on applicable accuracy rates. One might argue
that this defense of racial classification resembles the "equal application" doctrine rejected in
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1966) and McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1963). However, those decisions are inapposite, for the use of race at issue here neither restricts the rights
of citizens based on their race nor encourages segregation. Cf Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398
U.S. 144, 151-52 (1970) ("[A] State must not discriminate against a person because of his race
or the race of his companions, or in any way act to compel or encourage racial segregation.")
(footnote omitted).
279 See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 n.7 (1972) (racial classifications must
be necessary to achievement of a compelling state interest).
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defendant's interest in a fair trial. Perhaps the real concern is that the
witness, the jurors, or even the observing public will regard this instruction as evidence that blacks and whites still view the world very differently, as evidence that the effects of two centuries of slavery and
segregation have not been obliterated in the last three decades, and as
evidence that in many ways, two separate societies still exist. Such reflections may indeed be more "divisive" than the facade of a perfect
melting pot, for they provide an occasion and excuse for hate-filled explanations of persisting differences.
There is, however, another possible reaction to exposure to data on
such persisting differences: a sense of humility. It can be reflected in
private self-examination, looking inward for remnants of racism; it can
be reflected in public action looking for social causes and cures. To presume that the irrational response will both predominate and prevail
seems fundamentally contrary to democratic traditions; to presume that
public ignorance is to be preferred to public awareness seems
paternalistic.
Perhaps this is too optimistic. In any event, Judge Bazelon's argument 280 seems conclusive; whatever the prudent balance between truth
and tact in other contexts, surely truth must prevail if it may exculpate
a defendant in a criminal trial.
4. Other Problems
The major problem with expert testimony on the own-race effect is
its availability. Jury instructions, in contrast, are both cheap and available to all defendants. The problem with jury instructions, however, is
their questionable efficacy. One reason to doubt the efficacy of crossracial identification instructions is that some general research indicates
2 81 A
that jurors often do not comprehend or attend to jury instructions.
second reason is that jury instructions are probably poor vehicles for
conveying data. Although several commentators have suggested that
jury instructions could be altered to incorporate data, the statutory and
precedential barriers to such innovations are high. If the instructions
convey no data, telling jurors to "consider" a factor they know nothing
about may only confuse them. Furthermore, even if the barriers to incorporating data were surmounted, data conveyed in jury instructions
may carry little weight with jurors because the strength of the results
and authority of the conclusions cannot be explained.

See supra notes 251-55 and accompanying text.
281 See Strawn & Buchanan,Jugv Confusion. A Threat to Justice, 59
81 (1976).
280
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CONCLUSION

Neither expert testimony nor cautionary jury instructions are optimal means for ameliorating the effects of cross-racial identification error. A routine stipulation between prosecutor and defense attorney
summarizing the data on the own-race effects seems most desirable. The
next best alternative would be a data-laden judicial instruction delivered prior to the eyewitness testimony. These preferred variations on
expert testimony and cautionary instructions are not likely to be implemented, the first because most prosecutors will be uncooperative, and
the second because most courts will consider such a departure from precedent unwarranted. But the conclusion that neither expert testimony
nor jury instructions is a perfect solution does not argue against the legitimacy of the defendant's demand for these options. Unlike expert
testimony on many other sources of identification error, testimony concerning the own-race effect so clearly meets evidentiary standards that
permitting trial court discretion to determine its admissibility is unjustified. Unlike proposed cautionary instructions on other possible sources
of identification error, courts need not construe information on crossracial identification as commenting on the weight of the evidence.
Despite strong supporting data, the judiciary has been quite unresponsive to requests to put the issue of cross-racial recognition impairment before juries. In part this may be attributed to the
undifferentiated demand from commentators and defense attorneys: let
us show the jury the entire department store of psychological studies on
identification. A more limited argument and a more detailed offer of
proof would be more persuasive. But the reluctance of the judiciary
probably runs deeper: the lurking racial issues create a special readiness
to turn away. There is the fear that racial animosity may be aroused;
there is the shame that such deeply ingrained and widely spread racial
divisions persist; there is the frustration that there are no judicial remedies, only judicial accommodations.
There is also a special obligation. Of course, all sources of misidentification should be combatted, either through prevention or detection.
But most of these sources are rooted in unalterable imperfections in the
human system of recording, storing, and retaining information; in no
sense can society be blamed for "causing" such malfunctions. In contrast, cross-racial identification errors are not biologically inevitable, but
are the product of socialization. Although the exact mechanisms of these
social processes are uncertain, it seems fairly safe to assume that racism
and de facto segregation play an important role. Blame is therefore appropriate. That the blame is collective rather than individual is the primary reason that cross-examination is an inadequate remedy. It is also
the reason that society should assume collective responsibility. Courts
may be unable to eliminate cross-racial recognition impairment or its
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underlying causes, but they are able to ameliorate its effects. Because
most of the victims of judicial inaction will be poor black defendants,
courts should respond with special alacrity.

